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Abstract
EVAN PARKER-STEPHEN: Learning about Change: Information,
Motivation, and Political Perception.
(Under the direction of James A. Stimson.)
Does the American mass public, broadly speaking, meet its normatively prescribed
duty to monitor and react to changes in the political-economic world? Do specific
segments of the mass public pose an obstacle to this “monitorial model” of political
competence, which is itself central to democratic accountability? This study explores
these questions with three separate studies. It will be shown that citizen learning and
inference rest on two crucial factors: real-world information and psychological moti-
vation. Taken together, the three studies demonstrate how the relative importance of
information and motivation changes as a function of both individual characteristics,
including cognitive capability and partisanship, and the contextual characteristics of
the political environment, especially political campaigns. Attention is given to dif-
ferential learning across several socioeconomic and political partisan classes to assess
the breadth of understanding about politically consequential real-world change. It will
turn out that, on the issues that affect policy and election outcomes, politically relevant
information is often distributed fairly evenly across the mass public. The prototypi-
cally ill-informed, which is to say, the people who have relatively low levels of education,
income, and so forth, present a less serious obstacle to the monitorial model than do po-
litical partisans, whose perceptions are affected by their motives to preserve consistency
with their partisan attitudes and beliefs. However, even though these partisans’ percep-
tions are affected by such “motivated reasoning,” their temporal-perception patterns
reflect responsiveness to political-economic reality nonetheless. In broad perspective,
iii
this study demonstrates that knowledge of changing objective conditions, not static
facts, is an instructive barometer for gauging citizen performance. Contrasted against
conventional academic wisdom, the monitorial perspective produces markedly different,
indeed more optimistic, conclusions about the political-information competency of the
American mass public.
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Chapter 1
Political-Economic Information
Flow and Citizen Response
To a great extent, students of political knowledge have used cross-sectional surveys
to examine information distributions in the American mass public. This study intro-
duces an alternative, across-time approach. Accordingly, the central concern is not with
citizen recall of textbook-style political facts, or “information statics,” but with how
citizens respond to “information dynamics”—that is, information about changes in the
political-economic environment. To begin, we explain why distinguishing information
statics and dynamics is crucial for evaluating the mass public’s political-information
competence. Following this, we explore selected static and dynamic knowledge distri-
butions in the American mass public.
The question is why the static-dynamic distinction is needed. The answer rests on
the differential role that two learning mechanisms—cognitive capability and individ-
ual motivation—play in affecting understanding of static levels versus dynamic trends.
Capability is especially important, but not because it invariably affects what people
know (this is certainly true). Capability’s role is emphasized because information about
changes is relatively easier to comprehend. To help illustrate the point, consider percep-
tions about the Defense Department’s budget: It is easy to see that people could know
about an increase in defense spending without knowing the absolute amount spent on
defense. This is more than an appeal to common sense, however, because evidence
shows that perception systems are especially adept at recognizing changes across time
(Johansson, von Hofsten and Jansson, 1980).
A second learning mechanism, motivation, furthers the need to distinguish infor-
mation statics and dynamics. This is because information about changes is often of
greater value than news about levels. For example, imagine that one wishes to evalu-
ate government economic policy: Learning that unemployment is increasing has more
utility than learning that the unemployment rate is, say, five percent. And so, motives
to attend to news about dynamics should be relatively stronger. Now the crucial point:
If capability and motivation work as suggested, then together they imply something
important about mass political-information competence. Namely, the distribution of
information about dynamics could be more widespread, indeed more democratic, than
studies of static knowledge would suggest.
In the pages that follow we explore this possibility. By dividing the American
mass public into different “information classes”—groups whose members share simi-
lar capabilities and motivations—we can examine how thoroughly information statics
and dynamics resonate within each group. Importantly, this analysis focuses on in-
formation that has real political significance: We consider what people know about
economic conditions and what they know about the policy programs of the Democratic
and Republican Parties. As it turns out, the distinction between information statics
and dynamics makes a difference. Our results not only challenge previous conclusions
about political knowledge levels in the American mass public, but also reveal that the
microlevel foundations of aggregate opinion change are broader than what conventional
2
academic wisdom suggests.
1.1 Knowledge and Citizen Performance
Political observers’ interest in citizen knowledge is motivated largely by concerns about
a permanent and potentially large “information underclass” (Jerit, Barabas & Bolsen
2006, 266; also see Althaus 2003). As to its existence, as well as its breadth, findings
from cross-sectional research could not be more clear: To a wide degree, the American
mass public can recall neither general nor domain-specific political facts from memory
(Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Bennett, 1988; Luskin, 1987; Neuman, 1986). Bennett
(1988) reports a cogent summary result: On knowledge tests that probe static facts—
asking people to identify the names of elected officeholders, the details of public policy,
the procedural rules that undergird the U.S. system, and so forth—most Americans
receive the academic equivalent of a “D+” (but see Jerit, Barabas & Bolsen 2006).
Of course, this portrait of public ignorance contrasts sharply with the informed
character of aggregate-opinion dynamics. Here national economic fluctuations affect
aggregate presidential approval and electoral outcomes (Kramer, 1971; Hibbs, Rivers
and Vasilatos, 1982; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992; Durr, 1993); the public’s
preferences for activist government react to changes in current government policy (Page
and Shapiro, 1992; Stimson, 1998; Wlezien, 1995); and these policy preferences, in com-
bination with the political parties’ policy promises, influence the outcome of national
elections (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson, 1995). Thus the aggregated public, not the
isolated individual, constitutes a firmer foundation for democratic rule (Converse, 1990;
Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002).
The difficulty is that the aggregate-level results sidestep the problem of an infor-
mation underclass. Indeed, aggregate opinion patterns could be driven by a relatively
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small portion of the overall public—namely, by the well-informed—while the rest re-
acts more-or-less randomly (Converse, 1990; Page and Shapiro, 1992). Coupled with
the observation that ignorance of information statics is found disproportionately among
particular demographic groups, this “miracle of aggregation” suggests that broad seg-
ments of society might contribute minimally to the public’s overall political preferences
(Althaus, 2003). For democratic theory and for practical politics, it matters deeply
whether aggregated public opinion represents the consistent voice of an elite stratum,
on the one hand, or whether it represents a broader based input of substantial minori-
ties, majorities, or even the bulk of the citizenry, on the other. This is a matter of
evidence and it constitutes a central focus of this study.
To evaluate which of these possibilities rings true requires testing how thoroughly
information penetrates into the general public. The available evidence suggests that po-
litical information reaches a narrow segment of the overall public (roughly one-third1),
but yet, this work is silent about responsiveness to the political-economic changes that
move collective opinion. There are reasons to expect that the mass public could be
informed about these dynamics even though they do not know static facts. To see why,
let us consider how capabilities and motives relate to learning about information about
changes versus static facts.
1.1.1 Capability and Motivation
Capability should affect knowledge globally, as greater skill surely enhances under-
standing. But we are interested in whether it has a differential effect. On the surface
it is easy to see why comprehending changes could be less taxing than memorizing
political facts, but this expectation has deeper roots human perception systems. In
1NES interviewer ratings of respondent knowledge suggest that approximately one-third of one
pooled sample (1970–2004) has “Fairly High” or “Very High” levels of political information.
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short, scholars have shown that people’s perceptive capacities are better-equipped to
comprehend changes than statics. In Johansson and colleagues’ words, “perceptual sys-
tems are tuned especially to abstracting information from stimulus change over time”
(Johansson, von Hofsten and Jansson, 1980, 56). Although this claim is about visual
perception—literally, what people see—the broader point matters for political learning.
If people are especially adept at picking up on stimulus change, then irrespective of the
stimulus, comprehension of changes should occur on a relatively wider scale.
Motivation’s importance is similar because its influence should be especially pro-
nounced when people confront signals about political and economic dynamics. The
reason has to do with the relevance of these dynamics to decision-making. On the
economic side, news about trends can inform financial decisions and occupational con-
cerns. And on the political side, changes provide a basis for judging the performance of
elected officials and public policies. Consider, for example, that whether people know
the country is moving in or out of a recession, or whether the Republican Party is be-
coming increasingly conservative in its policy programs, matters greatly for economic
and political decisions. The ability to recall static facts—say, the actual percent of
GDP growth, or the length of a Senator’s term—is far less important. In short, be-
cause the incentives associated with learning about changing conditions outweigh those
associated with memorizing static facts, people should disproportionately pick up on
dynamics.
1.2 Information Class
The capability-motivation framework predicts differently shaped knowledge distribu-
tions. To move closer to examining this possibility, we now consider the problem in
concrete terms. The question is how one can assess the role of capability and motivation
in affecting static versus dynamic knowledge. Our solution is to contrast awareness of
5
information statics and dynamics across different “information classes”—that is, groups
of people that share similar capabilities and motivations. If the capability hypothesis
holds, then responsiveness to dynamics should occur on a wide scale—even among peo-
ple who widely lack knowledge of static facts. If motivation matters, then we should
be able to connect group-based incentives to observed response patterns.
To develop concrete classes, we consider how capability and motivation map onto
particular perceptual domains. More specifically, we ask how these mechanisms con-
nect to learning about national economic conditions and the policy promises of the
Democratic and Republican Parties. It is worth emphasizing that these perceptual do-
mains have real political significance. What people believe about economics and party
policies affects individuals’ political decision-making, on the one hand (on the economy
see Fiorina 1981, Kramer 1983; on party positions see Downs 1957, Brady & Snider-
man 1985), and aggregate-level opinion swings, on the other (Durr, 1993; MacKuen
and Stimson, 1989; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992).
1.2.1 Class and the Economy
What might an economy-based information class structure look like? Given the global
reach of capability’s influence on knowledge, there is good reason to expect that people’s
comprehension of economics will vary. Simple cognitive capability coupled with training
to deal with abstract ideas should allow better-educated people to understand basic
economic principles. And often, better-educated people are socialized to be more keenly
aware of the social as well as the personal environment. As a result, understanding of
economic conditions should be most pronounced among the high-education classes.
But in the economic world, agents will pursue economic information and under-
standing for purely instrumental reasons. Real estate agents and used car salesmen
must attend to inflation, interest rates, and economic cycles when they make a living.
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Consumers who buy houses, refrigerators and automobiles similarly profit from eco-
nomic literacy. Indeed, all economic agents, which is to say everyone, has good reason
to understand something about economics. However, those who are more closely inte-
grated into the financial decision-making structure should have stronger motivations to
pay attention. Therefore, private economic incentives should most strongly motivate
richer citizens to track the national economy.
Of course, in the U.S., education and income tend to be correlated for obvious
reasons. Although we might separate out people’s capabilities (read: education) and
motivations (read: income) as separate information classes, it is equally useful to ac-
knowledge that these factors are distributed jointly in the general public. Combining
education and income factors, then, one can say that people of higher socioeconomic
status (SES) should most readily pick up on information about the national econ-
omy. This expectation is consistent with considerable evidence already well-established
(Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000; Krause, 1997; Krause and Granato, 1998).
Crucially, however, a pattern that shows High SES people are most likely to learn
does not preclude the possibility that lower education and income classes are also
responsive—especially if learning about economic dynamics requires a relatively low
cognitive threshold. Furthermore, the economy’s connection to a range of self-interested
decisions means that that members of each SES class should have strong motives to
pay attention. Generally speaking, there is every reason to expect that capabilities
and motives extend far into the public simply because all members of the public act as
economic agents on a daily basis.
7
1.2.2 Class and Policy Programs
As to the public’s understanding of party policy programs, the capability-motivation
framework produces less clear-cut expectations. SES is important because higher educa-
tion should presumably make left-right information easier to comprehend—an ordinary
matter of capacity. But motives are less obvious. Rather than practical instrumentality
as in the economic case, political passion is the likely motivating force. And so, those
people with a personal partisan orientation should be most likely to attend to a party’s
left-right policy activity. To the SES dimension, therefore, one must add a party-based
one.
Introducing this partisan dimension modifies expectations about knowledge of po-
litical dynamics. Scholars have shown that political partisans appear to give careful
attention and thought to information about their own party, while at the same time
actively searching for information that confirms preexisting beliefs about political op-
ponents (Campbell et al., 1960; Markus and Converse, 1979; Bartels, 2002). The im-
portant implication for political knowledge is that party identifiers may not assimilate
reliable information about the opposition. Across all SES categories, therefore, assimi-
lation of out-party information should be less objective, and perceptions less accurate,
than for the in-party.
1.2.3 Message Character and Opportunity
Political learning is largely a function of individual-level attributes, but the character of
political information should also condition what people know: it affects opportunities to
learn (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Althaus, 2003). When the real world’s meaning is
easy to understand, when its implications are obvious, then anyone who pays attention
can comprehend the material. On the other hand, when the character of the world is
complicated or contradictory, then people will have a hard time figuring out its meaning
8
even if they seriously attend to public affairs. The message is, in theory at least, as
important as the capacity and motivation of the receiver.
For present purposes, information about the economy is fundamentally different
from information about party activity. Economic conditions are reported widely by the
media, which tend to focus on objective indicators of economic performance (Nadeau
et al., 1999, but see Hetherington 1996). Moreover, because economic experts are ac-
countable to an objective reality, they should put forward their best estimate of the
economy’s current standing and future prospects. This is not to say that all economic
information at any given time is freely available, uniform, or easy to understand: eco-
nomic analyses are marketed for a price, stocks are bought and sold by people who differ
in their economic evaluations, forecasters vary in their prognostications, and so forth.
However, in the larger sense, economic information should be pervasive, accurate, and
transparent. That these characteristics enhance opportunities to learn should widen
mass responsiveness to economic conditions.
In contrast, information about the political parties has a markedly different tone.
Although hints of the Republican or Democratic Party’s left-right behavior can be
gleaned from media reports about legislators’ voting patterns or from politicians’ com-
mentaries, consensual statements about the policy promises are not a staple of the
mainstream press. The onus to pick up on such political information thus falls heav-
ily on individual citizens. Complicating matters further, party leaders and political
activists, in the name of strategy, make misleading statements about their opponents.
Accordingly, the information sources to which many partisans turn will often deliber-
ately distort reality. Taken together, these observations suggest that acquiring knowl-
edge about party location is a challenging task.
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1.3 Data & Methods
What is needed now is empirical evidence of people’s information acquisition. Here one
must first identify, more specifically, what sorts of economic and political information
signals people encounter in their everyday lives.
1.3.1 Information Signals
Economic information is observable in several objective indicators of economic perfor-
mance. First, consider that most people ought to know something about inflation. It
is a matter of routine reporting and price rises are experienced in everyday activities.
Furthermore, inflation is a raw (almost) unambiguous number, which makes for easier
comprehension of trends if not absolutes. A second widely available economic signal
is unemployment. Many people should have incentives to follow unemployment condi-
tions and, like inflation, experts gauge unemployment using an objective number. A
third, relatively more opaque set of indicators involves current business conditions—
that is, whether the economy is in recession, expansion, or somewhere in between. The
Conference Board’s Leading, Lagging, and Coincident Indicators are each meant to tap
these conditions. Given the nature of the opinion data to be used here (see ahead), we
use the annualized month-to-month percentage change in each of the three indices to
construct a measure of business conditions that is the average percent change over all
three.
For information about the Democratic and Republican Party’s policy positions, we
focus on the aspects of party behavior that send signals about policy intentions. One
obvious signal is the voting behavior of legislators whom the media cover regularly.
To measure this signal we use Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s dw-nominate
House Legislator scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997), calculating an average score for
each party for each Congressional session. A second party position signal involves the
10
statements put forth by the party organization, the most prominent of which is the
party platform. Party platforms not only articulate an issue agenda, but also set the
ideological tone for the current presidential campaign, a fact which makes the party
platform an especially telling indicator of left-right position. To measure this we draw
on Ian Budge and colleagues’ party manifesto scores (2001), which, for every presidential
election year, indicate the liberal-conservative balance as reflected in the parties’ policy
promises.
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 illustrate what these indicators, which have been rescaled
to range from zero (far left) to one (far right), say about party activity from the period
1972 through 2000. The Democratic Party indicators are inconsistent: Legislative
voting in Figure 1.1(a) grows consistently more leftist over time, but party platforms
in Figure 1.1(b) suggest that party policy moved to the right through 1992 and then
veered leftward on out. This inconsistency suggests that ordinary citizens could find it
difficult to discern a pattern in the Democratic Party’s policy movement over the period
in question. For the GOP, on the other hand, House legislative voting in Figure 1.2(a)
and party platform scores in Figure 1.2(b) both show consistent upward movement.
According to both measures, then, Republican Party policy has become consistently
more conservative over the thirty-year period.
1.3.2 Knowledge Indicators
To tap knowledge of political-economic conditions, this study draws on data from two
public opinion surveys: the Surveys of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior’s (SCA)
monthly time series (1978–1996)2 and the American National Election Studies’ (NES)
Cumulative Series (1970–2000). We rely on two measures of static knowledge: (1)
2University of Michigan, Survey Research Center, Economic Behavior Program. ICPSR version.
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Survey Research Center, 1978–1996. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2000.
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Figure 1.1: Democratic Party Left-Right (0-1) Policy Position Indicators : 1972–2000
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Figure 1.2: Republican Party Left-Right (0-1) Policy Position Indicators: 1972–2000
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respondents’ forecasts of the actual inflation rate as reported in the SCA, and (2)
respondents’ relative placements of the Democratic and Republican Party on three
issue scales: Liberal-Conservative, Services-Spending, and Guaranteed Jobs.3
To measure knowledge of economic dynamics we use the Surveys of Consumer Atti-
tudes data. In addition to its monthly cross-sectional studies the SCA has an embedded
panel component. Approximately half of each cross-sectional sample was asked about
expectations of visible economic signals at two points in time, creating a two-stage panel
that has a six-month interval for panel respondents. This rolling panel design allows
us to control for individuals’ prior inflation expectations (at t − 1), and so we model
change in individual expectations as a function of change in objective conditions. Our
specific focus is on awareness of three types economic changes: people’s beliefs about
inflation, unemployment, and business conditions.4
To measure awareness of party left-right dynamics, the National Election Studies are
helpful. Since 1970, the NES have asked people to place the Republican and Democratic
Parties in left-right space on a variety of issues ranging from health care to minority
assistance to defense spending. However, these issue placements have not been asked
consistently, which means that we cannot use individual measures to assess receptivity
to changes in party programs. Our solution to this “irregular series” problem is to use
Stimson’s (1998) dyadic dominance algorithm to extract the left-right dimension that
is common to each of the specific party position placements.5 Doing so produces a
3For exact question wording please see Appendix.
4The inflation question reads: “By about what percent do you expect prices to go up (down), on
average, during the next 12 months?” The unemployment question asks: “How about people out of
work during the coming months—do you think that there will be more unemployment than now, about
the same, or less?” “Less” = 1, “Same” = 2, “More” = 3. The business retrospections question reads:
“Would you say that, at the present time business conditions are better or worse than they were a
year ago? “Worse now” = 1, “About the same” = 2, “Better now” = 3.
5The NES also asks respondents to place the Democratic and Republican Parties along the liberal-
conservative continuum, which is at first glance a clear measure of what people believe about party
left-right positioning. For the moment, we ignore this measure because it conflates operational and
14
left-right public perceptions time series for each party for each biennium, 1970–2000.6
This technique is employed repeatedly to create unique perceptions series for each of
the information classes of interest.
Figure 1.3 illustrates what these series, which have been rescaled to range from zero
to one, look like for the full NES sample in each year. The average perceptions series
are the solid black line, and for reference purposes, the light grey line shows the change
in the party platform scores. In Figure 1.3(a), one can see that the public has seen
Democrats as supporting more rightist policies through the 1980s—the average reading
in 1990 shows that the public saw a party that was “purely moderate,” falling at 0.50
on the left-right scale midpoint. Following this, however, perceptions begin to trend left
through the 1990s. Figure 1.3(b) shows that, with few exceptions, the public has come
to view Republicans as heading in a more conservative direction over the thirty-year
period.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Economic Statics
As a first test of static knowledge, we examine people’s ability to forecast the actual
inflation rate. The SCA asks every respondent to guess about the inflation rate in
the coming year, which is advantageous because inflation has objectively correct and
incorrect sorts of responses. When the consensus lies in the 3-5 percent inflation range,
symbolic notions of liberals and conservatives, and here interests are purely operational. In any
case, the derived policy perceptions series correlate with the liberal-conservative placement series at
approximately .65 for both Democratic and Republican Party perceptions. See the Appendix for the
exact questions and their loading on the underlying left-right factors.
6The reader may well wonder why the series does not extend to 2004. As will be seen, the measure-
ment strategy employed subsequently requires observations for all years. The 2002 ANES did not ask
questions about the Democratic and Republican Party issue-placement items, and so the time series
spans 1970–2000.
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Figure 1.3: Average Public Perceptions of Party Left-Right Policy Positions versus
Actual Left-Right Party Policy Activity: 1970 through 2000
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Table 1.1: Knowledge of Actual Inflation by Income and Education: Percent within
10-points of Optimal Forecast
Income
Education Low Medium High
Less than High School 70% 78% 83%
High School, Some College 81 86 89
College, Post-College Graduate 88 91 94
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Attitudes (Monthly 1978–1996)
for example, someone who volunteers 25-percent clearly knows little about inflation.
Table 1.1 presents people’s inflation expectations across education and income levels.
Accuracy is assessed by scoring the percentage of respondents in each category who offer
a reasonable guess about the inflation rate—one that is within 10 percentage-points of
the optimal forecast as predicted by current and previous values of inflation. As one
might expect, as education and income levels increase, so too does the percentage
of subgroup respondents who correctly forecast the inflation rate. In other words,
heightened capabilities and motives to pay attention produce heightened awareness of
inflation levels.
In Figure 1.4, we collapse the education and income categories into a tripartite
SES stratum. Figure 1.4 also reports a finer-grained assessment of accuracy. Moving
from left to right on the x-axis, we plot the percentage of respondents in each SES class
whose forecasts are within ten-, five-, and two-percent of the optimal forecast. Again the
expected pattern holds: Low SES citizens are least accurate while High SES citizens
are most likely to provide accurate forecasts.7 But note that in the case of the two
7Across classes, the standard deviation in forecast displacement, that is |Expectedi − Actualt|, is
also telling. Here the standard deviation of forecast for Low SES class is 8.4, but for Middle SES it is
6 and for High SES it is 4.5.
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percentage-point criterion—which, given the typical 3-5 percent range of inflation, is
not especially stringent—fewer than half in the High SES subgroup can provide accurate
forecasts. This is a telling result: although capabilities and motivations produce the
expected information hierarchy, the fact remains that a large proportion of High SES
people have difficulty forecasting inflation levels.
Test Criterion for Accuracy of Inflation Expectations
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Figure 1.4: The Percentage of Inflation Forecasts within the Specified Range: by So-
cioeconomic Status (SES)
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Table 1.2: Knowledge of Relative Democratic-Republican Position by Income and Ed-
ucation: Liberal-Conservative Scale
Income
Education Low Medium High
Less than High School 22% 25% 31%
High School, Some College 44 48 56
College, Post-College Graduate 76 79 82
Data Source: National Election Studies (1970–2000)
1.4.2 Political Statics
We report a parallel analysis of people’s grasp of party statics in Table 1.2, which re-
ports the conditional percentage in each education by income group who correctly place
the Democratic Party to the left of the Republican Party on the Liberal-Conservative
scale. Several features are notable. First, education, our proxy for capability, is es-
pecially influential. Between 76- and 82-percent of college educated people correctly
place Democrats to the left of Republicans. By contrast, people with less than a High
School education are correct only 22- to 31-percent of the time. Capability’s effect is
exactly as we would expect.8 In addition, we see that income—not likely a motivating
force—has only a marginal effect on accuracy.
Figure 1.5 combines the education and income groups into a single SES stratum. It
reports the percentage in each SES class that report relatively correct party placements
on three issue scales: the Liberal-Conservative, Spending-Services, and Guaranteed
Jobs placements. Clearly the high SES group is consistently most astute, but what
is more notable is the high degree of inaccuracy across the board. Fewer than half in
the High SES class correctly place the Democrats to the left of Republicans on the
8“Don’t Know” and “Refused” responses are scored as incorrect placements.
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NES Party Position Attribution Scales
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Figure 1.5: The Accuracy of Party Left-Right Policy Placements: Percent Placing De-
mocrats to the Left of Republican Party on Issue Placement Scales: by Socioeconomic
Status (SES)
defining party issues of taxes versus spending and government-sponsored assistance,
and this inaccuracy increases as one climbs down the SES ladder. Contrasted against
class-based understanding of economic statics, comprehension of party positions proves
to be particularly challenging.
That people, especially Low SES citizens, are not widely knowledgable about eco-
nomic and political absolutes confirms findings already established: Capability and
motivational differences across the SES information class structure produce a knowl-
edge distribution that is skewed toward ignorance in the lower classes. But does this
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distribution describe mass-level knowledge about changing conditions?
1.4.3 Economic Dynamics
Inflation
Let us return to the case of inflation. We have seen that ordinary citizens, especially
Low SES ones, have difficulty comprehending the inflation rate in an absolute sense.
Now we examine their grasp of change by regressing changes in respondents’ infla-
tion expectations on real changes in inflation, prior inflation trends and prior inflation
expectations.9 Here the important coefficients are those associated with changes in
realized inflation (∆ Inflation) and, to a lesser extent, the coefficients associated with
the lagged inflation rate (Inflationt−1). Note that a separate model is estimated for
each SES class.
Table 1.3 reports the results of the individual-level estimations.10 What is most
striking is the high degree of responsiveness to changes in inflation across SES class.
The significant influence of both changes in inflation and the lagged inflation rate
indicate that error correcting behavior occurs. Substantively speaking, Low, Mid-
dle, and High SES people all adjust their expectations about future inflation trends
systematically—that is, in accordance with real changes in inflation. Note the broader
significance: unlike the static case, comprehension of inflation dynamics is observable
throughout the mass public.
However, an information-class hierarchy still persists. As SES class increases from
9Readers will recognize this as the “error correction model” (see Beck 1987, Keele 2005) in that it
analyzes both long- and short-term effects of inflation on changes in expectations, controlling for prior
expectations.
10In the analyses that draw on the Survey of Consumer Attitudes, statistical significance tests are
not reported because all parameter estimates are easily distinguished from zero due to the large N.
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Table 1.3: Error Correction Model: ∆ Inflation Expectations on Inflation Information
and Lagged Expectations, 1978–1996
Socioeconomic Status
Low Middle High
∆ Inflation 0.45 0.83 0.82
(0.08) (0.05) (0.04)
Inflationt−1 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation Expectationst−1 −0.74 −0.73 −0.74
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 5.94 4.90 5.15
(0.57) (0.38) (0.26)
Adjusted-R2 .46 .49 .46
RMSE 8.32 5.75 4.63
N 9382 9901 13,488
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
Notes: All coefficients significant at p < .001
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Attitudes (Monthly 1978–1996)
Changes and Lags are six-month intervals
Low to Middle/High, the ∆ Inflation coefficient grows from 0.45 to above 0.80, re-
spectively. Furthermore, the RMSE for the estimations decreases monotonically with
increasing SES. Taken together, these statistics suggest that High SES individuals re-
spond more rapidly to changes in inflation and that they do so in more orderly ways.
Given that these individuals have, on average, relatively greater capabilities (read:
higher education) and stronger motives to pay attention (read: higher income), this
enhanced sophistication is what we should find.
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Table 1.4: Error Correction Model: ∆ Unemployment Expectations on Unemployment
Information and Lagged Expectations, 1978–1996
Socioeconomic Status
Low Middle High
∆ Unemployment 0.12 0.11 0.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemploymentt−1 −0.05 −0.08 −0.10
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment Expectationst−1 −0.73 −0.77 −0.73
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 2.03 2.23 2.28
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Adjusted-R2 .40 .41 .39
RMSE 0.65 0.64 0.64
N 14146 13908 18524
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
Notes: All coefficients significant at p < .001
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Attitudes (Monthly 1978–1996)
Changes and Lags are six-month intervals
Unemployment
As a second test of responsiveness to economic dynamics, we consider people’s grasp
of changes in U.S. unemployment. Following the same strategy as above, we model
changes in people’s unemployment expectations as a function of changes in the un-
employment rate, the lagged unemployment rate, and respondents’ prior expectations
about unemployment conditions.
The results of this analysis, which appear in Table 1.4, provide further evidence
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that information about economic changes resonates across the information class struc-
ture. For Low, Middle, and High SES groups, changes in unemployment significantly
influence changes in their expectations. The coefficient values for ∆ Unemployment
suggest that Low SES citizens respond slightly more quickly to short-term changes in
unemployment. But this result makes sense: Low SES people tend to have weaker job
security, thus their incentives to track unemployment signals carefully are strong.11
To this point, the analysis of economic responsiveness has concentrated on aspects
of the economy that might be peculiarly easy to inform—both inflation and unemploy-
ment are readily observable and regularly covered by the media. For politics, more
complicated economic conditions are important as well. With this in mind, we move to
a broader measure of people’s economic sensitivity—whether they comprehend changes
in business conditions.
Business Conditions
The SCA probes respondents’ retrospective evaluations of business conditions by asking
people whether these conditions are better or worse than they were a year ago. The
actual state of business conditions is reflected in the 12-month percentage change in
each of the Conference Board’s indicators of economic growth: the Leading, Coincident,
and Lagging Indices. (Recall that we use the average change over the three.) The error
correction model is again used to assess sensitivity to changes in economic growth.
Table 1.5 shows that the changing conditions coefficient increases monotonically
with information class—from .45 in the case of Low SES people to .58 among Middle
and .63 among High SES individuals. Clearly, then, High SES individuals find the
greatest sophistication in their responses to economic change. But even so, changes in
11This is not to say that everyone uses the same sorts of information to arrive at their judgments.
Some people likely rely on informal social networks or simple observation while others acquire infor-
mation from hard news sources or economic experts.
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Table 1.5: Error Correction Model: ∆ Business Retrospections on Business Conditions
Information and Lagged Retrospections, 1978–1996
Socioeconomic Status
Low Middle High
∆ Business Conditions 0.45 0.58 0.63
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Business Conditions −0.73 −0.75 −0.75
Retrospectionst−1 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Business Conditionst−1 0.25 0.28 0.27
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 1.82 1.97 2.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Adjusted-R2 .40 .43 .44
RMSE 1.65 1.65 1.63
N 12874 12590 16828
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
Notes: All coefficients significant at p < .001
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Attitudes (Monthly 1978–1996)
Changes and Lags are six-month intervals
economic growth do resonate right through the mass public. All three classes adjust
their economic evaluations to reflect changes in the actual economy, and the systematic
portion of the response is roughly comparable across classes. In short, matters of
economic boom and bust are observed and appreciated by everyone.
1.4.4 Political Dynamics
Evidence for broad-gauged comprehension of economic change is important. But for
questions of political-information competence, it is equally important to study how
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political information is distributed. Toward this end, we examine the public’s reactions
to changes in the Democratic and Republican Party’s policy programs. Recall that
these reactions are represented by extracting an average biennial perception of each
party on the familiar left-right (0-1) scale.
Admittedly, the task here is more difficult: People should pay less attention to
political as opposed to economic information because instrumental motivations are in
large measure absent. Further, political information lacks the clarity and commitment
to reality that characterizes economic information. Beyond theoretical concerns, the
policy awareness test is also complicated by measurement difficulties. The economic
analysis has 228 monthly readings of individual beliefs; on the political side we are
limited to 16 aggregated observations of public opinion and, for the platform data,
eight observations of each party’s position. This small sample introduces limitations
that affect modeling decisions throughout.
We begin by attending to a problem with the Democratic Party’s information sig-
nals, which are actually inconsistent. Platform scores suggest rightward movement
early and a shift left towards the end of the thirty-year period, whereas legislative
voting moves consistently leftward. There is no reason to suspect that one might be
more influential than the other and, logically speaking, citizens’ perceptions will not
track both. So we must begin with a calibration exercise that asks which of the two
Democratic Party indicators influences public perceptions. To do this, we draw on the
perceptions series of people who should be most likely to consider politics objectively—
High SES individuals who lack strong partisan commitments. We regress these judges’
average perceptions on party platforms and legislative voting separately. The regression
results (not reported) indicate that the judges class picks up on information registered in
the Democratic Party platform but not information about legislators’ voting patterns.
By contrast, both left-right indicators are significantly related to judge’s Republican
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Party perceptions (the latter is an especially potent predictor). For the sake of model
consistency, our focus for the time being is on the party platforms.
Party Platform Change
Regarding whether the overall public tracks party platform trends, one can identify
two sorts of questions. First, over the long haul, has the public changed its ideological
assessments of the two parties? Note that the question is about dynamics, not statics.
That is, the question is not whether people see Democrats as more liberal than Repub-
licans, but whether the public has shifted its perceptions of each party in accordance
with movements in the respective party platforms. Second, has the public picked up on
short-term, election-to-election swings in party policy? Evidence for public sensitivity
to short-term changes is stronger evidence for grasp of policy dynamics, but that does
not mean that a long-term relationship is not important as well. One might expect
that people discount specific election-to-election shifts but integrate information over
the long haul nonetheless.
To address the first (long-term) question we examine whether the overall public
comprehends long-term movements in party platforms by regressing party perceptions
on party platform scores. The regression estimates reported in Table 1.6 show that, in
fact, the mass public does pick up on party policy dynamics. For both the Democratic
and Republican Parties, as platforms grow increasingly liberal (conservative), the mass
public’s average placements do as well. This result is important for what is to follow
because it establishes a baseline: over the past quarter century the mass public, as a
whole, has adjusted its perceptions to reflect long-term trends in party positions.12
12Note that these are not mere linear trends. Both the Republican and especially the Democratic
Platform series have turning points that are picked up by the general public. The exact timing of
these shifts, as can be seen in Figure 1.3, is not exact.
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Table 1.6: Party Left-Right Perceptions: by All Respondents
Perception Series
Democratic Party Republican Party
Party Platform Score 0.21* 0.50*
(0.09) (0.18)
Constant 0.36** 0.37**
(0.11) (0.04)
Adjusted-R2 .39 .48
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
*p < .05, **p < .01; One-tailed tests
In each model, N = 8
Let us now move past this baseline to consider party perceptions across the infor-
mation class structure. Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 present separate regression analyses for
each SES class. Looking first at Table 1.7 we encounter a puzzle: Low and Middle SES
classes comprehend the general Democratic Party trend but High SES people do not.
This pattern might seem to contradict the capability-motivation theory, but in fact, the
theory likely predicts this result. Consider: party identifiers—who are differentially mo-
tivated to learn about own- versus opposite-party policies—are not distributed evenly
across the socioeconomic stratum. Low and Middle SES classes are disproportionately
Democratic, which means that these classes are comprised in large measure of people
who are attentive to and thoughtful about the Democratic Party. The High SES class,
on the other hand, has a greater proportion of Republicans—the very people who are
least likely to seek reliable information about the Democratic Party’s evolution.
We return to this complication momentarily, but first consider Table 1.8, which
shows that people of each SES class comprehend the Republican Party’s long-term
movement. And, importantly, the foundations of the overall public’s response (as seen
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Table 1.7: Democratic Party Left-Right Perceptions: by SES
Socioeconomic Status
Low Middle High
Party Platform Score 0.32** 0.24* 0.18
(0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
Constant 0.34** 0.36** 0.35**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Adjusted-R2 .55 .29 .17
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
*p < .05, **p < .01; One-tailed tests
In each model, N = 8
in Table 1.6) appear to be fairly egalitarian. In the Republican Party case, the data
clearly indicate that all sorts of people, including those at the bottom of the SES scale,
observe and understand the long-term trajectory of Republican Party policy.
Let us now return to the puzzle posed by the results in Table 1.7. Partisan bias
could explain the result, but to test this we need to add a second party-based dimension
to the information class structure. That is to say, we need separate left-right percep-
tions series for Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. These series are illustrated
in Figure 1.6. Clearly partisans, especially Republicans, locate the opposition away
from the center and toward the endpoints of the left-right scale. Republican identifiers
see Democrats as substantially more liberal than do Independents or Democrats them-
selves.13 Democrats locate Republicans slightly closer to the conservative endpoint.
The net impact of these differences suggests that partisans’ ability to register shifts in
13This pattern recalls the “Left Shift” first observed by Brady and Sniderman (1985). See MacK-
uen and Parker-Stephen (2006) for an elaboration on the prevalence of left-shifted party preference
attributions in the American mass public.
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Table 1.8: Republican Party Left-Right Perceptions: by SES
Socioeconomic Status
Low Middle High
Party Platform Score 0.48** 0.47* 0.51*
(0.12) (0.19) (0.18)
Constant 0.36** 0.39** 0.37*
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11)
Adjusted-R2 .69 .42 .50
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
*p < .05, **p < .01; One-tailed tests
In each model, N = 8
the opposition party is muﬄed somewhat.
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 consider whether statistical differences in party left-right per-
ceptions are apparent across partisan groups. In the case of the Democratic Party,
Table 1.9 portrays a clear partisan bias effect. Democratic identifiers, who are most
likely to pay attention to the Party’s platform, clearly react to information about their
party. Independents, too, show significant (though weaker) learning. But Republican
identifiers, who are rarely likely to encounter relevant information about the Demo-
cratic Party via Democrats, display across-time perceptions that are unconnected to
the party platforms. For further evidence of the information-class hierarchy note the
Adjusted-R2 values, which increase monotonically with motivation to learn about the
Democratic Party’s policy program.
Table 1.10 shows that Democrats, Independents, and Republicans all pick up on
long-term left-right swings in Republican Party policy. The consistency of Republi-
can elites’ policies, indeed the Party’s outright embrace of conservatism since the late
30
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Figure 1.6: Average Left-Right Position: by Partisan Group, 1970 through 2000
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Table 1.9: Democratic Party Left-Right Perceptions: by Party Identification
Partisan Group
Democrats Independents Republicans
Party Platform Score 0.31** 0.30* 0.14
(0.09) (0.15) (0.12)
Constant 0.34** 0.35** 0.36**
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
Adjusted-R2 .59 .32 .04
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
*p < .05, **p < .01; One-tailed tests
In each model, N = 8
1960s, probably helps to explain why information rings throughout the party-based in-
formation class structure. Without staking too much on this result, it seems as though
staying “on message” in politics can increase awareness of party dynamics.
Short-term Change
Our final step in assessing how political-information dynamics are distributed is to
consider how election-to-election swings in party policies affect left-right perceptions.
Because the political-information class structure has proven to be more nuanced than
that for the economy, we consider receptivity within each partisan information class.
Table 1.11 presents the Democratic identifiers model. Previously we saw that infor-
mation about the Democratic Party reaches Democrats to a greater extent than non-
Democrats, but here, one can observe variation among Democrats as well. High capa-
bility Democrats pick up on short-term policy changes, while among those with lesser
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Table 1.10: Republican Party Left-Right Perceptions: by Party Identification
Partisan Group
Democrats Independents Republicans
Party Platform Score 0.54*** 0.56*** 0.49***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12)
Constant 0.37*** 0.29*** 0.36***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Adjusted-R2 .65 .70 .53
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; One-tailed tests
In each model, N = 8
capabilities, these swings go unobserved. That learning takes place even though Demo-
cratic Party elites have put forth conflicting signals is a normatively appealing (albeit
puzzling) result. Table 1.12 tempers this optimism, however, as it shows that not one
Republican SES class reacts to short-term changes in Democratic Party platforms.
House Legislator Voting
To this point, the analysis of across-time political knowledge has focused on the party
platforms measure exclusively. This has necessitated the study of learning in presi-
dential election years—a mere seven instances of party policy change. But recall that,
in the Republican Party case, where the information signal is consistent, we also have
at our disposal the average Poole-Rosenthal scores for each Congress. Although this
Congressional voting measure does not accord with public perceptions of Democrats,
it seems to resonate forcefully in the GOP case. As a final analysis, therefore, we take
advantage of the expanded time series and use the Congressional voting data to assess
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Table 1.11: ∆ Democratic Party Perceptions (Short-term): Democrats by SES
Socioeconomic Status
Low Middle High
∆ Party Platform Score 0.40 0.10 0.74*
(0.29) (0.21) (0.25)
Party Platform Scoret−1 −0.10 −0.08 0.71*
(0.54) (0.27) (0.28)
Left-Right Perceptiont−1 −0.13 −0.19 −2.17*
(1.16) (0.63) (0.67)
Constant 0.11 0.13 0.68*
(0.32) (0.19) (0.20)
Adjusted-R2 .82 .23 .63
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
*p < .05, **p < .01; One-tailed tests
In each model, N = 7
how information about the Republican Party moves through the electorate in the short
term.
Presented in Table 1.13, the in-party model reveals that political information res-
onates broadly. Here, both Middle and High SES Republicans pick up on short-term
changes in their party’s voting behavior. Moreover, the results reveal a strong cor-
rective effect as people “return” to their general (correct) beliefs about the left-right
behavior of the Republican Party. In short, Republicans widely attend and react to
changes in the voting behavior of Republican Party elites.
A similar, albeit weaker, pattern emerges in Table 1.14, which examines changes
in Republican Party perceptions among Democrats. Here Middle and High SES De-
mocrats comprehend short-term changes in elite voting. Although opposite-party bias
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Table 1.12: ∆ Democratic Party Perceptions (Short-term): Republicans by SES
Socioeconomic Status
Low Middle High
∆ Party Platform Score 0.43 0.51 0.62
(0.49) (0.36) (0.40)
Party Platform Scoret−1 0.01 0.04 0.24
(0.47) (0.28) (0.28)
Left-Right Perceptiont−1 −0.61 −0.89 −1.45
(0.91) (0.72) (0.44)
Constant 0.28 0.36 0.44
(0.26) (0.21) (0.21)
Adjusted-R2 .18 .45 .25
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
*p < .05, **p < .01; One-tailed tests
In each model, N = 7
affects perceptions, it does not entirely rule out intelligent responses to political change.
Both Middle and High SES people appear, on average, capable of comprehending
changes in the Republican Party’s policy promises.
This pattern, however, holds only for the best case. When information about the
political party is ambiguous in the case of the Democratic Party, or when the data
are too sparse, this short-term relationship between elite party change and public per-
ceptions atrophies. From what we have seen, it is possible that party positions get
translated into public perceptions, but this is not easy. Of course, this is a matter of
mechanisms. The overall long-term behavior of the political parties is presumably the
most visible trend, thus it is here that capabilities for seeing change are most likely
to result in accurate understanding. And indeed, the long-term relationship between
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Table 1.13: ∆ Republican Party Perceptions (Short-term): Republicans by SES
Socioeconomic Status
Low Middle High
∆ Poole-Rosenthal Score 1.98 4.05*** 3.80***
(1.33) (0.55) (0.83)
Poole-Rosenthal Scoret−1 0.59 0.33 0.47
(0.66) (0.17) (0.33)
Left-Right Perceptiont−1 −0.55 −0.92*** −0.78**
(0.40) (0.13) (0.22)
Constant −0.04 0.33*** 0.19
(0.22) (0.08) (0.12)
Adjusted-R2 .04 .23 .65
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
*p < .05, **p < .01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .001; One-tailed tests
In each model, N = 15
changes in party platforms and public perceptions stands strong. What is lacking,
however, is the resolution needed to observe the direct impact of these party platforms
on public opinion.
1.5 Discussion
The public’s grasp of political and economic affairs has long been a subject of compelling
interest. The consistent conclusion of scholarly research—which holds that political
ignorance is pervasive in American politics—is now (nearly) conventional wisdom. In
a revealing remark, Luskin opines that recent attempts to refute this conclusion have
moved merely “from denial to extenuation” (Luskin, 2002). Though there may be
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Table 1.14: ∆ Republican Party Perceptions (Short-term): Democrats by SES
Socioeconomic Status
Low Middle High
∆ Poole-Rosenthal Score 0.96 2.28* 1.69*
(0.87) (0.85) (0.55)
Poole-Rosenthal Scoret−1 −0.29 0.62 0.67
(0.23) (0.43) (0.37)
Left-Right Perceptiont−1 −0.26 −0.70* −0.66*
(0.16) (0.30) (0.27)
Constant 0.37* 0.05 0.01
(0.16) (0.12) (0.09)
Adjusted-R2 .19 .34 .38
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
*p < .05, **p < .01; One-tailed tests
In each model, N = 15
exceptions, that is, the overarching conclusion about the American mass public must
be that ordinary people are grievously ill-informed about public affairs.
We disagree. Our analyses of thirty year’s worth of political-economic data indicate
that the public is able to comprehend and assess critical changes in the real world.
People have instrumental reasons to pay attention to the economy and, although they
may not grasp static facts, the largest portion of the public does incorporate real-world
information into their assessments of inflation, unemployment, and business conditions.
Thus the most essential components of retrospective economic voting, for example, are
available to people from the top of the information scales down to the level of, say, the
bottom tenth of the mass public.
Citizen learning about the parties’ policy programs, on the other hand, is a more
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severe test for democracy. Understanding left-right abstractions requires some political
understanding, and on the motivational side people have weaker instrumental reasons
to learn about party positions. Indeed, their main motivations having to do with
partisan identification hardly encourage accuracy. And yet, the evidence suggests that
the public does do a fair job in learning about change in the parties’ stance. Certainly,
the long-term evolution of the parties’ policies from the 1970s to the present has been
noticed and learned by the public. This is true for the overall public, but importantly,
it is true for the top, middle, and bottom thirds of the information class structure.
There is even evidence (if not consistently strong evidence) of the public’s reacting
to short-term changes in the parties’ policies. Here the best evidence suggests that
sensitivity to short-term change in the environment exists in two-thirds of the public.
By distinguishing static facts from change, we move away from a schoolboy definition
of information competence to a focus on political learning dynamics. This proves to be
a critical step: the focus on change produces markedly different conclusions about how
ordinary citizens handle political information, and in turn, what ordinary citizens know
about public affairs: the mass public, in the broadest sense, is sensitive to fluctuations
in the economy and the policy direction of the major American parties.
This result has important implications for the character of American democracy.
Scholars have known for some time that the temporal patterns of mass political behav-
ior are on average orderly, but exactly who is responsible for generating these sensible
movements remains a point of contention. And for good reason: A public signal gener-
ated by the top ten or twenty percent of the public is far different than one generated
by two-thirds or ninety percent of the public. Previous work on this question argues
that the shape of aggregate opinion patterns is determined in large measure by an
elite information class (Bartels, 1996; Althaus, 1998). Our results consistently indi-
cate otherwise. Across a range of capabilities and motivations, representing a broad
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collective of diverse interests and desires, information about consequential real-world
phenomena resonates to produce ordered and sensible reactions to political phenom-
ena. The distribution of information dynamics is best characterized as egalitarian and
democratic.
1.6 Measurement Appendix
The following 7-point policy attribution scales are used to construct the across-time
left-right perceptions series for the mass public and all other subgroups. Here we make
use of Stimson’s (1998) algorithm to extract an averaged reading of mass perceptions
for each biennium The factor loadings on this dimension are reported in Table 1.15 for
the estimation that uses the full NES sample in each study year.14
Health There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs.
Some feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all
medical and hospital expenses. Others feel that medical expenses should be paid
through private insurance like Blue Cross. Where would you place the () party
on this scale? (1972, 1976, 1978, 1988, 1994)
Jobs Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every
person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government
should just let each person get ahead on his/her own. Where would you place
the () party on this scale? (1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1988, 1992,
1994, 2000)
Aid to Minorities Some people feel that government in Washington should make
every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and
other minority groups. Others feel that the government should not make any
special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. Where would
you place the () party on this scale? (1970–2000, but not 1992)
Rights of Accused Some people are primarily concerned with doing everything pos-
sible to protect the legal rights of those accused of committing crimes. Others feel
that it is more important to stop criminal activity even at the risk of reducing the
rights of the accused. Where would you place the () party on this scale? (1970,
1972, 1974, 1976, 1978)
14Readers familiar with the NES issue-placement scales will note that a frequently-asked item re-
garding the proper role for women (working versus in the home) is not included in the dimensional
analysis. The reason is twofold. First, the question suffers from severe social desirability bias. Second,
the item loads poorly on the left-right scale.
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Urban Unrest There is much discussion about the best way to deal with the problem
of urban unrest and rioting. Some say it is more important to use all available
force to maintain law and order-no matter what results. Others say it is more
important to correct the problems of poverty and unemployment that give rise to
the disturbances. Where would you place the () party on this scale? (1970, 1972,
1974, 1976)
Services-Spending Some people think the government should provide fewer services,
even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other
people feel that it is more important for the government to provide many more
services even if it means increases in spending. Where would you place the ()
party on this scale? (1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000)
Defense Spending Some people believe that we should spend much less money for
defense. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Where
would you place the () party on this scale? (1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990,
1992, 1996, 2000)
Russia Some people feel it is important for us to try very hard to get along with
Russia. Others feel it is a big mistake to try too hard to get along with Russia.
1984,1988: Some people feel it is important for us to try to cooperate more with
Russia, while others believe we should be much tougher in our dealings with
Russia. ALL YEARS: Where would you place the () party on this scale? (1980,
1984, 1988)
Table 1.15: DYMIMIC Loadings of NES Party Issue Placements on Left-Right Dimen-
sion
Party
Issue Scale Democratic Republican
Health −.92 .94
Jobs .59 .95
Aid to Minorities .87 .93
Rights of Accused .62 .16
Urban Unrest −.97 −.48
Services-Spending .93 .15
Defense Spending -.71 −.97
Russia .97 −.92
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Chapter 2
Perception Aggregation
In a notable departure from earlier research, students of political behavior began, in
the 1980s, to study the movement of aggregate public opinion over time. Among other
things, these scholars have found that aggregate-level political perceptions have roots
in real political conditions (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002; Zaller, 1992; DeBoef
and Kellstedt, 2004), react to policy changes in expectedly rational ways (Page and
Shapiro, 1992; Wlezien, 1995; Stimson, 1998), and move systematically with experts’
expectations about economic growth (Durr, 1993; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson,
1992; Kramer, 1983). In short, the aggregate results have consistently revealed an
informed and responsive mass public.
The evidence for an informed public is rigorous and robust. It is also paradox-
ical, however, because numerous individual-level studies show that citizens’ political
perceptions are neither accurate (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Granberg, 1993) nor
impartial (Bartels, 2002; Kuklinski et al., 2000; Evans and Andersen, 2006). To the con-
trary, these studies have consistently found a mass public that is grievously ill informed,
indeed misinformed, about politics. To a great extent, individual citizens, especially
strong partisans, appear to see and hear what they want to see and hear.
Seeking to reconcile the macro-micro discrepancy, some scholars have drawn on
the properties of aggregate opinion in large samples. They posit that the opinions of
the ill informed are “errors” in that they originate from random guesses and stable
responses rooted in predispositions (Converse, 1990; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson,
2002). Because neither randomness nor stable responses create systematic variance
over time, these researchers argue that ill-informed responses will cancel out in the
aggregate. Lacking orderly opinions, the ill informed contribute no variation to explain.
As a result, aggregate measures of opinion “magnify” the opinions of the well informed,
which explains why these measures find overall accuracy even though many people are
misinformed about politics (Converse, 1990; Page and Shapiro, 1992).
The catch, however, is that the assumption of errors canceling is problematic.(Althaus,
1998, 2003; Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000; Bartels, 1996). In Charles Taber’s
words, “the central rub is that ‘error’ in individual information processing is frequently
not random...but rather is systematically distributed” (2003, 457). This should be
especially true for strongly partisan individuals, as they will often ignore or discount
information when it goes against their partisan beliefs. When these committed citi-
zens encounter political news, they “accept what is congenial to their partisan values
and reject what is not” (Zaller, 1992, 241). In the most recent terminology, political
partisans are “motivated reasoners.”
The work on motivated reasoning tends to be cross-sectional, but its across-time
implication is clear: motivated reasoning will lead partisans to develop political mis-
perceptions that endure over time, even in the face of contrary evidence. If so, then the
aggregate results, as scholars have reported them, are even more perplexing. One of the
most striking features of the aggregate patterns is their orderly response to real-world
events and political phenomena. How can one reconcile aggregate-level accuracy with
individual-level perceptual bias?
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In the pages that follow, I offer an explanation that helps to resolve this puzzle. The
explanation rests on the observation that both individual- and aggregate-level scholars
have overstated their cases for the character of partisans’ perception. On the one
hand, while motivated reasoning undeniably exists, especially among strong partisans,
individual-level scholars have not adequately explored how objective conditions can
and do override motivations to see the world in a certain way. On the other hand,
aggregate-level scholars, by not considering the potential for systematic errors, have
put forward an incomplete theory of perception aggregation.
To demonstrate support for these claims, this study considers individual and ag-
gregated political perceptions simultaneously. The individual-level analysis examines
whether partisans’ perceptions systematically favor a preferred real-world state. Work
on motivated reasoning gives reason for expecting such bias, but because this work
has been cross-sectional, it treats objective conditions as constants—that is, as non-
factors.1 By examining the accuracy of partisans’ and non-partisans’ subaggregate
perceptions over time as well, this study grants objective conditions a dynamic role.
This “micro-macro” approach makes a difference. This study is the first to put forward
an empirically-driven resolution to the micro-macro perceptions paradox.
2.1 The Character of Individual-Level Perception
As defined by Bernard Berelson and his colleagues, “political perception refers to the
process by which people develop impressions of the characteristics and positions of po-
litical candidates, parties, and institutions” (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954,
from Granberg 1993, 70). Fundamental to this process is the manner by which individ-
uals interact with political information. Today the common interaction occurs via the
1This observation follows Kramer (1983), who argued that cross–sectional analyses are problematic
because they seek to explain variation in perceptions of a constant.
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media: People are exposed to information about candidates, parties, and institutions,
which they use to form and update relevant impressions.
As to the character of these impressions, a standard assumption is that increasing
exposure to political information increases the likelihood that perceptions will be in-
formed and in sync with the real world across time. But partisans are perhaps the
most attentive of all political observers. Surely they are more active in politics. So
why might their political perceptions diverge from real conditions? To see this, one
must consider how partisan motivations direct information acquisition and, in turn,
the formation and updating of political perceptions.
2.1.1 Motivated Reasoning and Misperception
In their seminal study, Campbell et al. suggested that the party attachment “raises
a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to
his party orientation” (1960, p. 133). Working from this contention, several political
scientists have argued that political partisans are relatively more closed-minded political
observers (Bartels, 2002; Lodge and Taber, 2000; Zaller, 1992). Social psychologists,
too, have suggested that people’s partisan beliefs make them less willing to evaluate
contrary information objectively (Lundgren and Prislin, 1998; Kunda, 1987; Lord, Ross
and Lepper, 1979). Of late, scholars have termed this behavior “motivated reasoning”
(Kunda, 1990).
For partisans, motivated reasoning involves two distinct processes: selective expo-
sure to information and selective information processing.2 Selective exposure says that
partisans will seek out political information from like-minded sources (Sears and Freed-
man, 1967; Taber and Lodge, 2006). With regard to perceptions, selective exposure is
2Work on motivated reasoning tends to focus on selective information processing. However, as
selective exposure results from the same partisan motivations, it is viewed here as the second horn of
motivated partisan reasoning.
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important because it promotes an unbalanced reading of the issues, which should in
turn create misperceptions about political conditions.
Yet, even if partisans do attend to balanced sources, a second mental process, se-
lective information processing, can keep them from seeing the world in an even-handed
manner. Selective information processing says that partisans will process contrary
political information using directional or “partisan” goals rather than accuracy goals
(Kunda, 1990; Lodge and Taber, 2000). That is, when they are exposed to infor-
mation that runs contrary to prior beliefs, partisans are more likely to defend these
beliefs—by either ignoring the information or counterarguing it mentally—than to seek
accurate understanding (Taber and Lodge, 2006). This defensive behavior should be
especially pronounced among the well-informed, as these knowledgeable partisans have
the necessary “ammunition” with which to counterargue belief-inconsistent news. The
crucial point is that information discounting can lead partisans to maintain preferred
beliefs irrespective of the evidence. Thus, like selective exposure, selective information
processing predicts systematic misperception, or “bias,” in partisans’ perceptions.
Partisans attempt to avoid holding inconsistent beliefs because doing so creates
cognitive “discomfort” (Krosnick, 1990, also see Festinger 1957). The magnitude of
this discomfort becomes greater as individuals place greater importance on their be-
liefs (Petty and Krosnick, 1995; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Krosnick, 1990), so among
strongly committed partisans one should observe the effects of these motives to reject
contrary information. Coupled with the importance of information for counterarguing,
then, strong partisans with high levels of political knowledge should be most likely to
hold biased perceptions. On the flip side, non-partisans, who have no reason to discount
information, should tend to report perceptions that are unbiased.
Now the crucial question: What are the implications of motivated partisan reasoning
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for the process of perception aggregation? The systematic nature of individual parti-
sans’ errors suggests that measures of perception will be rife with the misperceptions
of party identifiers. And thus, systematic error will not cancel out. If so, then partisan
misperceptions should contribute to, indeed significantly bias, aggregated measures of
public opinion.
2.1.2 A Constraint on Motivated Reasoning
Scholars have made a strong case for motivated partisan reasoning. Yet, in so doing,
many have bypassed a critical caution: Rather than haphazardly reaching favorable
outcomes, people who are motivated by directional goals “attempt to be rational...and
construct a justification of their conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate ob-
server” (Kunda, 1990, 482). In other words, real-world events and objective conditions
can override the desire to reach preferred conclusions. As a result, partisans’ percep-
tions should be “a compromise between the wish to reach a particular conclusion and
the plausibility of that conclusion given the available data” (Ditto and Lopez, 1992,
569).
For two reasons, the potential for objective conditions to constrain motivated reason-
ing is of great consequence. First, if partisans encounter objective negative information
about their party, then partisans’ attempts to construct plausible counterarguments will
be made more difficult. This implies that, over time, partisans will come to process
disagreeable information. Second, partisans’ biased tendencies ought to affect their
across-time perceptions differently than objective conditions. The influence of party
identification on perceptions should be roughly constant because partisanship is the
most stable of political traits (Converse, 1964; Converse and Markus, 1979; Carsey
and Layman, 2006). The influence of objective conditions, by contrast, should be
ever-changing because real-world events and conditions are constantly in flux. These
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dynamic considerations, which rest on responsiveness to real information, have been
underexplored by motivated reasoning scholars. Yet, as will be seen, this role for reality
is central to understanding partisans’ temporal political perceptions.
2.2 The Character of Aggregate-Level Perception
In stark contrast to the individual-level case, aggregate-level scholars argue for the
order and accuracy of political perceptions. And in fact, from changes in national tax
policy and defense spending preferences (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Bartels, 1991) to
shifting economic expectations (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992; Durr, 1993) to
movements in “public policy mood” (Stimson, 1998), the public, as a whole, seems to
learn about real-world events and adjusts its perceptions (and subsequent preferences)
accordingly. Fundamentally, then, “aggregate-level accuracy” refers to the collective’s
objective, reasonable responses to real-world events and political phenomena.
But rather than behaving as objective observers, political partisans, especially
strong identifiers, should perceive real-world conditions in ways that support their
partisan beliefs. If so, then persistent directional differences will be evident in the
across-time perceptions of Democrats and Republicans, differences which will endure
in the aggregate. This expectation highlights an important shortcoming of the aggre-
gate accuracy thesis: in large measure, scholars have not acknowledged the potential
for systematic differences—that is, systematic errors—in aggregated perceptions. Of
the few scholars who have analyzed but not found that partisan bias persists after
aggregation (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Gerber and Green, 1999), none have contrasted
these perceptions with a baseline measure of reality. Moreover, none have isolated the
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sub-group patterns for strong partisans.3 As a result, these studies have failed to ad-
dress the core of the individual-level critique—that strong partisans’ errors are likely
to persist in the aggregate.
To summarize, both individual- and aggregate-level scholars have overstated their
cases for political perceptions. At the individual level, scholars have not adequately
acknowledged that objective conditions can constrain motivated partisan reasoning.
And at the aggregate level, scholars have largely ignored the potential for systematic
errors to persist post-aggregation. Taken together, these considerations bridge the
extant gap between the individual- and aggregate-level arguments. Studying them
simultaneously should thus help to resolve the paradoxical findings about political
perceptions.
2.3 Economic Perceptions
A strong test of bias in perception requires selecting a perceptual domain that is central
to American politics. Moreover, it requires looking at perceptions of an objectively-
measured political object. Toward these ends, this study considers people’s perceptions
of the United States economy. The economy is a prominent part of the American
political debate and its standing matters for individual citizens. What is more, national
economic performance is measured using objective indicators, which, taken together,
offer a thorough and unambiguous reading of economic conditions. As such, these
indicators can provide a sense of what an objective rating of the economy’s standing
ought to be.
Presumably most Americans acquire information about the U.S. economy from
3Page and Shapiro (1992, 310–311) examine the across-time differences between Democrats’ and
Republicans’ perceptions of the Vietnam War, and Gerber and Green Gerber and Green (1999) study
the across-time differences in presidential approval for Democrats, Republicans, and Independents
(also found in Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002, Chapter 5).
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the media, which tend to focus on objective indicators of performance (Nadeau et
al., 1999; but see Hetherington, 1996). For partisans and others, however, objective
information is not all that is relevant. A complication arises in that many people
hold the sitting president responsible for the economy’s standing (Kinder and Mebane,
1983; Mondak, Mutz and Huckfeldt, 1996; Rudolph, 2003). This attribution implies
that, when partisans evaluate the economy, they should look to draw conclusions which
reflect favorably on their own political party (Evans and Andersen, 2006).
Specifically, party identifers should give greater weight to economic information
that supports their own beliefs and desires about the president. When they identify
with the presidential in-party, these committed citizens should confront and process
information that gives the economy a favorable assessment. This should in turn lead
in-party members to adopt positively biased perceptions of economic conditions. When
partisans belong to the presidential out-party, by contrast, they should be motivated
to encounter and encode economic news that gives a negative assessment. Thus for
out-party members, the expected result is negatively biased economic perceptions.
2.3.1 The Real Economy as Constraint
Because news about the economy is largely objective, partisans, in defending their
beliefs, will be limited to making “plausible” counterarguments about its standing.
In other words, partisans will find it difficult to discount unfavorable information,
especially as the evidence mounts. As a result, as economic conditions change with
time, partisans should adjust their perceptions so that they more accurately represent
its actual state. If so, then, despite motivations to the contrary, partisans’ across-time
economic perceptions should track changes in the real economy.
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2.4 Data and Methods
Unravelling the micro-macro paradox requires two complementary analyses. The first,
individual-level analysis, finds three components to be crucial: measures of economic
perceptions and partisanship, and a method for assessing individual-level perceptual
bias. The second, aggregate-level analysis, requires two components: aggregate mea-
sures of economic perceptions disaggregated by party membership, and a baseline mea-
sure of economic conditions that can be used to assess whether partisan bias persists
post-aggregation. The 1980–2004 American National Election Studies Cumulative Se-
ries provides data for all but the baseline measure of the economy, which can be con-
structed using prominent indicators of economic performance.
2.4.1 Individual-Level Data
The Cumulative Series offers a measure of Individual Economic Perceptions that asks
respondents to rate the national economy’s performance over the previous year.4 Re-
spondents have been asked for these retrospective economic evaluations in every two–
year survey since 1980, so the individual-level analysis uses pooled 1980–2004 data. For
interpretation purposes, the response categories have been recoded (“Much worse” =
−2; “Somewhat worse” = −1; “Stayed the same” = 0; “Somewhat better” = 1; “Much
Better” = 2).
With regard to party identification, I use the Cumulative Series’ familiar 7-point
scale, which ranges from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican. Because the data
are pooled across multiple years, however, the raw party identification measure fails
to leverage expectations about the direction of bias in Democrats’ and Republicans’
4The two–part question reads as follows: “Would you say that over the past year the nation’s
economy has gotten better, stayed (all years except 1984: about) the same or gotten worse? (If
better:) Would you say much better or somewhat better? (If worse:) Would you say much worse or
somewhat worse?”
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economic perceptions. What is needed is an indicator that reflects whether, in a given
year, Democratic or Republican identifiers were members of the presidential in-party
or the presidential out-party. I create four party–membership dummy variables: Strong
and Other In-Party, and Strong and Other Out-Party. The “Other” category collapses
weak and leaning identifiers because these two levels of party commitment bring about
similar political behavior (Keith et al., 1992).5 Independents are ignored, but not
because these party-neutral citizens are unimportant. Rather, Independents serve as
an excellent baseline category for comparison. Lacking partisan goals, Independents
have no reason to engage in motivated partisan reasoning. Therefore, their economic
evaluations are not likely to contain systematic errors.
The amount of political information people possess is essential to the act of updating
perceptions across time. To account for respondents’ Information Level I draw on NES
interviewers’ 5-point information rating scale.6 A straightforward expectation is that
people with high levels of information should be more in touch with the actual status of
the economy. But yet, if these people are also partisans, then information equips them
with the means to reject belief-inconsistent information by mustering evidence against
it. And so, increased information levels should accentuate partisans’ misperceptions of
the economy’s standing, especially among those with the strongest party commitments.
To test this possibility I create interactions between political information and each of
the in- and out-party indicators, producing four Party-Membership by Information
interactions in total.
5Equality of coefficients tests show that, in predicting economic evaluations, there are no statisti-
cally significant differences between the resultant weak and leaning in- or out-party coefficients.
6On these ratings interviewers rate respondents as having “Very Low,” “Fairly Low,” “Average,”
“Fairly High,” or “Very High” levels of political information. Although this measure does not tap
knowledge per se, it has nearly the same reliability as a scale constructed from a 15-item factual
knowledge battery (see Bartels 1996, which cites a 1985 unpublished study by John Zaller that found
that the scale reliability difference between interviewer ratings and a multi-item knowledge battery
scale is a mere .04.)
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Rounding out the model of individual economic perceptions are additional respon-
dent attributes that researchers (Conover, Feldman and Knight, 1987; Conover and
Feldman, 1986) have shown to influence economic perceptions. Specifically, control
variables reflecting respondents’ Family Income, Education Level, Race (Black = 1)
and Gender (Male = 1) are added to the model. Finally, to control for year–specific
factors not yet captured, Year dummy variables are created for every biennium (Base-
line Year = 2004).
2.4.2 Aggregate-Level Data
Aggregate Economic Perceptions are obtained by calculating a weighted average of
all respondents’ retrospective economic evaluations for each biennium, 1980 through
2004.7 To examine partisan patterns, I create average evaluations series for the follow-
ing four partisan groups: (1) Strong In-Party, High Information (2) Strong In-Party,
Low Information (3) Strong Out-Party, High Information and (4) Strong Out-Party,
Low Information. Two “non–partisan” series are also created: Independent, High In-
formation and Independent, Low Information.8
Now an objective measure of economic conditions is needed. I develop such a mea-
sure, called the Economic Performance Index, using level and change scores for several
prominent economic statistics: the Consumer Price Index, the Civilian Unemployment
Rate, and the Indices of Leading, Lagging, and Coincident Indicators. To ensure that
these statistics are in line with the annual character of the retrospective evaluations,
summary scores are calculated that represent real changes in each indicator during the
7Because systematic asymmetries in evaluation are likely to be found for the party identification
categories, the overall sample average is weighted by the proportion of respondents in each party
identification category in each survey year.
8People who receive an interviewer information rating of “Fairly High” or “Very High” comprise
the High Information category, while those who are perceived to have “Average”, “Fairly Low” or
“Very Low” levels of political information comprise the Low Information category.
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previous year.9
The Economic Performance Index must be directly comparable to the aggregated
partisan perceptions series, for it is this comparison that tests the accuracy of partisans’
perceptions. Achieving this correspondence requires constructing the index in two
steps. First, the weighted average retrospective evaluations series is regressed on the
economic indicator summary scores. Then, from this regression, predicted values are
obtained.10 These predicted values are the Economic Performance Index to be seen
in Figures 2.1–2.3 below.11 Importantly, the predicted values calibrate the objective
economic indicators to the measurement system of the retrospective evaluations item,
specifically to the 5–point response scale.
2.5 Individual-Level Results
The results of three ordered probit estimations are reported in Table 2.1. Clearly, party
identification stands as a powerful determinant of people’s economic evaluations. Look-
ing first at the reduced model (Column 2), members of the presidential in-party are
9The Consumer Price Index average score is the average value of inflation over the previous year.
The change score is obtained by calculating the total change in inflation over the previous year (No-
vember 1 of the previous year to October 31 of the survey year). For the unemployment rate score,
I use the average unemployment level and also calculate the 12-month average in the Civilian Un-
employment Rate (again, from November 1 of the previous year to October 31 of the survey year).
Finally, for the Leading, Lagging, and Coincident Indicators scores, I calculate the change in each
index during the second and third fiscal quarters of the survey year. The logic underlying these six-
month time frame is that because the three business conditions indicators capture lags, concurrent,
and future economic performance simultaneously, taken together, they should provide a rich summary
of the year’s business climate.
10This strategy is also used by Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002, Chapter 2, who use predicted
scores to create a scaled measure of the economy’s performance.
11The Economic Performance Index has the following descriptive statistics: Mean: −0.38; Standard
Deviation: 0.62. As this is an exercise in prediction, potential collinearity problems are ignored and
statistical significance tests are not of central interest. For the curious reader, the results of the
regression are reported in the Appendix, Table 2.4.
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Table 2.1: 5-Point Retrospective Economic Evaluations on In-Out Party, Information,
and Demographics
Model
Predictor Reduced Interaction Full
Strong In-Party 0.57 (0.03) 0.40 (0.07) 0.44 (0.07)
Other In-Party 0.30 (0.03) 0.23 (0.06) 0.25 (0.06)
Other Out-Party −0.08 (0.03) 0.07 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06)
Strong Out-Party −0.26 (0.03) −0.05 (0.07) −0.04 (0.06)
Political Information 0.09 (0.04) 0.16 (0.09) 0.34 (0.09)
Strong In-Party × Information — 0.25 (0.12) 0.20 (0.12)
Other In-Party × Information — 0.10 (0.11) 0.09 (0.11)
Other Out-Party × Information — −0.28 (0.11) −0.26 (0.11)
Strong Out-Party × Information — −0.38 (0.12) −0.40 (0.12)
Economic Performance Index (EPI) — — 0.90 (0.04)
EPI × Information — — 0.57 (0.06)
Family Income 0.04 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Education Level 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Black −0.16 (0.03) −0.16 (0.03) −0.16 (0.03)
Male 0.17 (0.02) 0.17 (0.02) 0.17 (0.01)
Year Dummy Variables a a a
τ1 −1.54 (0.05) −1.51 (0.06) −1.01 (0.06)
τ2 −0.62 (0.05) −0.58 (0.06) −0.09
τ3 0.49 (0.05) 0.52 (0.06) 1.03 (0.06)
τ4 1.68 (0.06) 1.71 (0.06) 2.22 (0.06)
Initial log-likelihood −26550.3 −26550.6 −26550.32
Log-likelihood at Convergence −23182.9 −23155.6 −23105.937
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 .127 .128 .130
χ2 6734.82*** 6789.47*** 6888.76***
Note: Ordered Probit Estimates, Standard Errors in Parentheses (N = 17,968)
†Year dummy coefficients (baseline = 1998) not reported but available upon request.
*** p < .001
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significantly more likely to offer positive retrospective evaluations (relative to Indepen-
dents). Strong in-party members find the largest bias effect with a coefficient of 0.57,
and the coefficient for weak and leaning in-party partisans—“Other” at 0.30—indicates
that the bias effect decreases with decreasing strength of party attachment. In short,
in-party partisans, especially strong identifiers, cling to their preferred real-world state:
they are consistently more likely to believe that economic conditions have improved
under the watch of their party.12
Out-party partisans, by contrast, are more likely to report economic evaluations that
are negatively biased. The strong out-party parameter of −0.26, which is the larger of
the out-party parameters, says that negatively-biased economic evaluations are most
likely to be held by strong out-party identifers. Leaning and weak out-party members
also evaluate the economy with systematic negativity, but the smaller coefficient value
of −0.08 indicates a weaker consistency effect.
Note that, in the reduced model, in-party members display stronger desires to de-
fend their party’s handling of the economy. Relative to out-party membership, in-party
status has nearly twice the biasing effect on economic perceptions. This asymmetry
implies that the strong in- and strong out-party biases are not equally countervailing,
12The pooled cross-sectional results cannot rule out the possibility that, rather than party identi-
fication shaping citizens’ economic perceptions, these perceptions actually determine citizens’ party
identification. To confirm that causality runs from party identification to economic perceptions and
not the reverse, I estimate a simple cross-lagged structural model using data from the 1994 and 1996
waves of the 1992-94-96 American National Election Studies Panel Study. In this model (N=287),
respondents’ education, family income, and race serve as exogenous control variables that influence
party identification and economic evaluations in the same year (education level influences party identi-
fication only). More importantly, respondents’ lagged (1994) party identification (PIDt−1) and lagged
retrospective economic evaluations (Econt−1) influence both their current (1996) party identification
(PIDt) and their current retrospective evaluations (Econt). The maximum likelihood estimation fits
the observed covariance matrix. The results of the estimation show that the unstandardized path
coefficient from PIDt−1 to Econt is highly significant, at 0.10 (the standard error is 0.02). Therefore,
1994 values of party identification determine 1996 economic evaluations. The unstandardized path
coefficient from Econt−1 to PIDt, on the other hand, is 0.10 (0.06). And thus, 1994 economic per-
ceptions do not significantly determine 1996 party identification. For additional work showing that
causality runs from party identification to economic perceptions, see DeBoef and Kellstedt (2004),
Bartels (2002), and Erikson (2004).
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and thus, not likely to cancel one another in the aggregate. Instead, in-party per-
ceptions should disproportionately affect aggregate measures, which, with respect to
economic perceptions, means that aggregated retrospections will consistently display
undue optimism.
The interaction model (Column 3) provides confirmation that strong partisans dis-
count information about the economy. To roughly the same degree, increasing levels of
political information further increase strong partisans’ propensities to report economic
evaluations that favor their respective party. Thus those people who are most knowl-
edgeable about politics are also least likely to agree about real economic conditions.
Note that information enables out-party bias—the strong out-party coefficients are not
significant in isolation.
It is possible that the strong effect of people’s information levels is an artifact of fail-
ing to account for real-world economic information. The full model in Column 4 shows
that this is not the case. Here both the biennial score for the Economic Performance
Index (recall that this index is a scaled summary of objective economic change) and an
interaction between the EPI and people’s information levels are included. The results
are again consistent with the notion that partisans selectively attend to and process in-
formation about the economy: Despite finding that information about the real economy
has strong and significant effects on retrospections, the in-out bias coefficients remain
large and significant.
To give a more descriptive account of the effects of partisan bias, I re-estimate
the full model without the year dummy controls and transform the coefficients into
predicted probabilities.13 These probabilities are reported in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3
13Excluding the year dummy controls has a trivial effect on the coefficient estimates and, because the
model includes the Economic Performance Index, it controls for the conditions unique to each year, if
not alternative period effects. Predicted probabilities are obtained using clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg
and King, 2003).
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Table 2.2: ∆ Probability of Evaluation Response: Independent to Strong In–Party
Information Level
Economic Evaluation Lowest Highest
Much Worse −0.10 −0.14
Somewhat Worse −0.05 −0.09
Stayed the Same +0.07 +0.08
Somewhat Better +0.07 +0.13
Much Better +0.01 +0.02
as the change in the probability of response moving from Independents’ evaluations to
strong partisans’ evaluations. Distinctions are once again made between respondents
with high versus low political information.
Looking first at Table 2.2 we see that, relative to Independents, strong in-party
members who have very low political information (Column 2) are 10-percent less likely
to say that the economy got “Much Worse” over the previous year and 5-percent less
likely to say that it turned out “Somewhat Worse.” In total, then, these partisans are
15-percent less likely to give the economy a negative evaluation. At the other end of
the evaluation scale, these in-party partisans are 7-percent more likely to say that the
economy was “Somewhat better” over the past year and 1-percent more likely to say
that it was “Much better,” totaling an 8-percent increase in the likelihood of evaluating
the economy favorably. Strong in-party members with high political information (Col-
umn 3) find a marked increase in the likelihood of perceptual bias: they are 23-percent
less likely to give the economy a bad mark and 15-percent more likely to say that the
economy has improved over the previous year.
Table 2.3 shows that strong out-party partisans’ pattern of predicted change is op-
posite that of strong in-party partisans’. Low-information strong out-partisans behave
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Table 2.3: ∆ Probability of Evaluation Response: Independent to Strong Out–Party
Information Level
Economic Evaluation Lowest Highest
Much Worse 0.01 +0.16
Somewhat Worse 0.00 +0.01
Stayed the Same −0.01 −0.11
Somewhat Better −0.01 −0.06
Much Better −0.01 −0.01
much like Pure Independents, being only slightly more likely to give the economy a
“Worse” rating and 2-percent less likely to say that it has turned out “Better.” Out–
party members with high information, however, are 17-percent more likely to give the
economy a negative evaluation. At the same time, these knowledgeable out-partisans
are 7-percent less likely to say that it was “Better.” Here the difference in probabil-
ity change between the two political information categories is large, which confirms
that with information comes a substantial increase in the likelihood of out-partisan
perceptual bias.
On the whole, the individual-level analysis provides cogent evidence that motivated
partisan reasoning creates biased perceptions. Most striking, in- and out-party parti-
sans consistently report economic evaluations that are more likely to favor their own
political party. What is more, having more information about politics only enhances
the likelihood of this bias.14 That partisan bias is systematic implies that partisans’
perceptual errors will not cancel out in the aggregate. To see whether this is so, let us
examine strong partisans’ and non-partisans’ subaggregate economic perceptions.
14This finding contradicts scholars’ claim that increased interest in politics generates higher levels
of factual knowledge (see, e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996: Chapter 4).
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2.6 Aggregate Consequences of Partisan Bias
We have seen that partisans’ economic evaluations favor their preferred real-world
states, which implies that the distribution of their economic evaluations will display
small variance. And when an average is calculated from similarly biased responses,
sample estimation logic predicts that this average will be biased as well. Therefore,
as an estimator of economic reality, partisans’ aggregate evaluations are not likely to
coincide with actual economic conditions. In line with individual-level expectations,
in-party partisans’ subaggregate evaluations should be positively biased and out-party
partisans’ negatively biased.
As a point of contrast, consider the distribution of non-partisan Independents’ eco-
nomic evaluations, which also served as the reference point at the individual level.
Independents tend to have lower levels of political knowledge, so their economic evalu-
ations are likely to display wide-ranging errors. Using properties of estimators terminol-
ogy, Independents’ evaluations should be inefficient. But because these non-committed
citizens have no reason to discount economic news, Independents’ evaluations should
nevertheless be unbiased. Averaging over inefficient but unbiased evaluations, sample
estimation logic predicts an unbiased estimate of economic conditions. Therefore, In-
dependents’ subaggregate evaluations should fairly accurately represent the economy’s
actual state.
2.6.1 Subaggregate Economic Perceptions
To assess the aggregate consequences of partisan bias, Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, and
Figure 2.3 chart the 1980–2004 aggregate economic evaluations series for strong in-
party, strong out-party, and Independent identifiers respectively. Each figure presents
a separate series for respondents with high versus low political information. Also present
in each figure is the Economic Performance Index, which, the reader will recall, reflects
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an objective measure of economic performance scaled to the retrospections item. The
difference between the perceptual series values and the Economic Performance Index
values thus demonstrates the degree of bias (accuracy) in each of the perceptions series.
Looking first at Figure 2.1, in every year, strong in-party partisans’ aggregate eval-
uations of the economy fall above the Economic Performance Index. In other words,
these evaluations are consistently positively biased. To quantify this bias, I calculate
the differences between the aggregate evaluation values and the performance index val-
ues. Then I obtain the average of these differences, called “average bias” scores. Strong
in-party members with lower political interest find an average bias of 0.30, or 6-percent
higher than the EPI. Among those with high political information, aggregate percep-
tions are markedly more positively biased, averaging 0.56 units (11.2 percent) above
the performance index.
In Figure 2.2, systematic partisan bias again persists after aggregation. In this case,
strong out-party partisans’ aggregate perceptions are consistently negatively biased.
For those with low knowledge, the average bias score is −0.32. Among strong out-party
members with high information, the average bias score increases slightly to −0.34, or
6.8-percent below the EPI. Relative to in-party bias, then, out-party bias has a weaker
displacement effect. This suggests that aggregate economic perceptions, overall, could
display exaggerated optimism. I return to this question momentarily.
In contrast to the strong partisan series, the Independent series in Figure 2.3 align
tightly with the Economic Performance Index.15 The average bias scores are smaller,
too: −0.15 for Independents with low political information and −0.01 for those with
high information. As the single-year deviations from the performance index fall above
it in some years and below it in others, Independents’ aggregate evaluations show no
15A difference in means test confirms that there is no statistically significant difference between the
Economic Performance Index and the Independent, High Interest series. This result is not met for the
low interest series, however.
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Figure 2.1: Strong In-Partisans’ Average Retrospections and the Economic Perfor-
mance Index, 1980–2004
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Figure 2.2: Strong Out-Partisans’ Average Retrospections and the Economic Perfor-
mance Index, 1980–2004
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systematic error tendencies. The deviations appear to be random, resulting from Inde-
pendents’ lack of knowledge about economic conditions. This result provides empirical
confirmation of macrolevel scholars’ claims about statistical filtering under random
error: upon aggregation, Independents’ inefficient perceptions cancel out.
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Figure 2.3: Independents’ Average Retrospections and the Economic Performance In-
dex, 1980–2004
2.6.2 Partisan Composition
We have seen that, at the sub-group level, partisans’ evaluations are biased in the ex-
pected direction. But we have yet to see what this means for the overall aggregate
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response in each year (i.e., for the overall levels). It is possible that in- and out-party
displacement is countervailing, with the positively biased in-party levels being effec-
tively cancelled out by negatively biased out-party levels. And although this does not
seem to be the case on average—high-information strong in-partisans receive relatively
larger average bias scores—this reading does not adjust for the partisan composition,
which is to say, the proportion of each partisan group relative to the overall public.
To test for composition effects, two alternative bias (i.e. distance) measures are
created for each of the four partisan groups for each year. Unlike before, the distance is
not calculated relative to the Economic Performance Index, but instead as the distance
between the “Baseline Public” retrospection—the average biennial retrospections av-
eraged over everyone except strong partisans—and each of the strong partisan series.
Importantly, the baseline public’s series corresponds closely with the EPI: both the
correlation (Pearson’s r = .98) and the illustration in Figure 2.7 (see Appendix) make
this clear. Equally important, the Baseline Public plus the four partisan sub-groups
comprise the entire sample, which means that one can meaningfully weight the bias
scores by the sub-group proportions.
Motivated bias scores (MBS) are created by adding the out-party bias—that is, the
distance between the out-party mean and the Baseline Public mean retrospection—to
the in-party bias via simple arithmetic: (In-Partyt−Baselinet) + (Out-Partyt−Baselinet).
This is done separately for each information class. These motivated bias values are then
weighted by respective group proportions to produce the total bias scores (TBS) for
each year. Figure 2.4 plots these bias scores for High-Information and Low-Information
Strong Partisans. In Figure 2.4(a) panel (1), one can see that in its raw form, moti-
vated in-party bias is not equalled by out-party displacement (were this the case, the
point would fall on the x-axis). Panel (2) shows that in-party favoring persists after
weighting the raw in-out distance scores by the proportion of knowledgeable strong in-
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and out-partisans, respectively, although now the magnitude of the bias is diminished.
By this weighted measure, informed in-party bias in overall retrospections was most
pronounced in 2004.
The low-information scenario illustrated in Figure 2.4(b) tells a different story. Now
there are substantial differences between what the motivated and total bias scores in-
dicate about aggregating partisan bias. Although in-party bias is rooted in stronger
motivations, its influence is tempered by the larger proportion of more weakly moti-
vated out-partisans—especially in 1982 and 1988. Figure 2.5 combines the High- and
Low-Information bias scores and shows that the overall impact of motivated reasoning
is clear: a consistent in-party bias in aggregated economic perceptions. These figures
demonstrate an important point about perception aggregation: in terms of shaping the
levels of the aggregate measures, the strength of motivation coupled with the composi-
tion of the partisan electorate matter crucially for the bias in the levels.
There is solid evidence that strong partisans’ aggregate perceptions are systemati-
cally biased, whereas Independents’ are not. What is more, as Figure 2.5 makes clear,
the effect of perceptual distortion does not “balance out.” That errors persist in aggre-
gate political perceptions should thus be acknowledged by scholars who argue for the
overall accuracy of these perceptions. But of course, aggregate-level scholars tend to
focus not on the character of single-year responses, but on response patterns over time.
Having observed substantial aggregate bias in every year, is there reason to expect that
partisans’ aggregate perceptions will display such “longitudinal accuracy”?
2.6.3 Longitudinal Economic Perceptions
Recall that partisans’ perceptions should be influenced by biased motivations and ob-
jective conditions, and that these two influences will affect perceptions differently over
time. On the one hand, the influence of partisan bias should be constant from election
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Figure 2.4: Motivated and Total Bias in Aggregated Economic Perceptions: by Infor-
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Figure 2.5: Motivated and Total Bias in Aggregated Economic Retrospections: All
Strong Partisans, 1980–2004
to election. This means that bias will contribute trivial variation to across-time percep-
tions over the period in question, and will therefore be inconsequential in longitudinal
analysis. On the other hand, because real-world conditions are constantly changing,
the influence that they bring to bear on perceptions should change as well.16 As a re-
sult, real conditions should contribute most of the variation to across-time perceptions.
Put differently, changes in partisans’ aggregate perceptions should be driven by reality.
16A strong period of economic growth, for example, would be expected to shape people’s economic
perceptions in a manner far different than would a period characterized by high inflation and unem-
ployment.
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If so, then partisans’ perceptions will be longitudinally accurate even though they are
biased.
Looking once again at Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, we see illustrative evidence for lon-
gitudinal accuracy in strong partisans’ perceptions. In both figures, strong partisans’
aggregate perceptions move with the Economic Performance Index—that is, these per-
ceptions track change in economic conditions. In Figure 2.3, Independents’ aggregate
perceptions also move in sync with the real economy. Across all years, therefore, the
economic perceptions series display updating that is not only similar, but also sensible
given actual conditions.
To test statistically for longitudinal accuracy, I correlate each of the aggregate per-
ceptions series with the Economic Performance Index. Displayed graphically in Fig-
ure 2.6, each of the six correlations indicates a strong perceptions-reality relationship.
Strong partisans’ aggregated perceptions correlate with the performance index at from
0.91 to 0.96. Independents’ aggregate perceptions, moreover, correlate with the perfor-
mance index at from 0.92 to 0.95. So, for partisans and non-partisans alike, sub-group
economic perceptions are closely connected to the real economy. Although the levels
of strong partisans’ aggregate perceptions are biased, changes in these perceptions are
not.
2.7 Discussion
To conclude, scholars working at both the aggregate- and the individual-level of analysis
have overlooked important facts about political perceptions. At the aggregate level,
scholars have focused on the role of information updating in citizen understanding.
But these scholars have not addressed the potential for systematic errors to emerge in
collective measures of opinion. And, as we have seen, systematic partisan misperception
not only exists, but also endures in the aggregate. Contrary to what many might
68
Partisan Group Perceptions Series
Co
rre
la
tio
n 
wi
th
 E
co
no
m
ic 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 In
de
x
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
In−Partisan Out−Partisan Pure Independent
.93
.91
.96
.93
.92 .95
High Information
Low Information
Figure 2.6: Correlations: Aggregate Perceptions with the Economic Performance Index
presume, this bias is enhanced by information. Its crucial consequence is to produce
an incumbency advantage in economic perceptions, in which the aggregated measures
are unduly inflated by the perceptions of presidential in-partisans.
But even so, across time, reality overrides partisans’ motivations to distort informa-
tion. The examination of partisans’ across-time perceptions has shown that objective
conditions drive perceptual change. The across-time perspective shows, moreover, that
partisan bias is of little consequence to the accuracy of the aggregate perceptions studied
here (i.e., perceptions of economics during general election campaigns). Longitudinal
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analysis magnifies the influence of reality on perceptions, while at the same time mini-
mizing the effects of bias. As a result, from election to election, the clear and consistent
result is that aggregate perceptions change in ordered and accurate ways across time.
Taken together, these results present a compelling explanation of the discrepancy
between micro- and macro-level political perceptions. The key point is that partisans’
perceptions derive from both biased motivations and objective considerations. For
this means that, despite their efforts to discount disagreeable information, partisans
nevertheless look to real-world conditions when updating their political perceptions. As
a result, their across-time perceptions react sensibly to real-world events and political
phenomena. Having shown that perceptual accuracy emerges from the aggregation of
biased political perceptions, the micro-macro paradox is hereby resolved.
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2.8 Appendix
Table 2.4: Average Retrospective Evaluations on Economic Indicators
Economic Indicators Parameter
Consumer Price Index, Annual Change −0.11
(0.19)
Consumer Price Index, Annual Average −0.004
(0.002)
Civilian Unemployment Rate, Annual Change 0.06
(0.10)
Civilian Unemployment Rate, Annual Average −0.18*
(0.06)
∆ Leading Index, 2nd through 3rd Quarter 0.41**
(0.09)
∆ Coincident Index, 2nd through 3rd Quarter 0.11
(0.15)
∆ Lagging Index, 2nd through 3rd Quarter 0.43**
(0.08)
Constant 1.23
(3.46)
F–Statistic 17.56**
Adjusted-R2 0.91
N 13
Note: OLS Regression estimates. Standard Errors in parentheses. Two–tailed tests.
* p < .05; ** p < .01
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Figure 2.7: Baseline Public Average Economic Retrospections and the Economic Per-
formance Index, 1980–2004
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Chapter 3
When Perceptions Polarize: How
Motives and Information Shape
Partisan Inference
Political campaigns are designed to provide voters with information relevant to elec-
toral choice. But does campaign information resonate? For more than four decades,
students of American elections consistently argued that national campaigns have “min-
imal effects” on electoral behavior (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Patterson
and McClure, 1976; Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1992; Finkel, 1993). But yet, more recently,
several scholars have begun to grant campaigns a central determining role (e.g., Iyengar
and Simon, 2000; Brady, Johnston and Sides, 2006).
What explains the shifting academic consensus? A leading impetus has been schol-
ars’ claim that voters learn from campaigns. Two general findings comprise the bur-
geoning case for campaign learning. First, campaigns appear to increase the electoral
significance of political-economic perceptions, which is to say that these perceptions
become relatively stronger determinants of voter preference later in the campaign cycle
(Gelman and King, 1993; Wlezien and Erikson, 2002). Second, campaigns reduce voter
uncertainty, in that exposure to campaign messages increases both the precision of
people’s candidate issue perceptions (Alvarez, 1997; Franklin, 1991; Conover and Feld-
man, 1989; Bartels, 1988) and the number of reasons people have for liking/disliking
presidential candidates (Holbrook, 1999).
To be sure, the evidence that campaigns increase both the significance and the
certainty of people’s political perceptions could signal responsiveness to campaign in-
formation. But do these patterns signify that voters assimilate information about actual
political-economic conditions? Do campaigns, as Gelman and King (1993) once put it,
generate “enlightened” preferences? Because neither pattern speaks to the accuracy of
people’s perceptions, it is impossible to say. Consequently, scholars’ case for campaign
learning is problematic.
The fundamental difficulty is that nearly every study of presidential elections since
the 1940s shows that campaigns activate and reinforce voter partisanship (Iyengar and
Simon, 2000). And crucially, political partisans are not passive information-receptors.
These committed citizens tend to ignore opposition arguments (Taber and Lodge, 2006;
Sears and Freedman, 1967) and counterargue evidence that runs contrary to their pre-
ferred beliefs (Kruglanski, Webster and Klem, 1996; Kunda, 1987), especially if partisan
attitudes are accessible (Fazio et al., 1995) and/or strong (Biek, Wood and Chaiken,
1996; Dawes, Singer and Lemons, 1972; Pomerantz, Chaiken and Tordesillas, 1995). Be-
cause campaigns increase both the accessibility and the strength of partisan attitudes,
then, the implication for learning is clear: As campaign intensity builds over an election
cycle, voters should have not only greater access to politically relevant information, but
also greater motivation to resist it.
This tension complicates a theory of campaign learning considerably. Clearly cam-
paign dynamics are important. The remaining question is whether information recep-
tion or resistance is more likely to shape voter understanding during the campaign. The
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available evidence on partisan learning points not toward the answer, however, but to a
second puzzle: In fact, both learning styles—termed here “objective information updat-
ing” and “motivated reasoning,” respectively—appear to characterize partisan learning
and inference. Proponents of objective information updating have found that similar
receptivity to actual-world conditions generates patterns of parallel group-level belief
change across diverse partisan groups (Gerber and Green, 1998, 1999; Green, Palmquist
and Schickler, 2002; Page and Shapiro, 1992, Chapter 10).1 Proponents of motivated
reasoning, however, have found that the importance of partisans’ preferred-world states
generates information processing bias and belief polarization (Taber and Lodge, 2006;
Fischle, 2000). In addition to asking how campaigns shape voter information, then, one
must ask why these starkly different accounts of partisan learning both find empirical
support.
In the pages that follow, I present an analysis that not only shows how campaigns
affect voter understanding, but also elucidates why scholars have observed discrepant
patterns of partisan inference. The analysis overcomes a conceptual limitation of much
research on campaign effects by looking beyond voting to perceptions of two politically
consequential domains: the economy and the (21st Century) IraqWar. It also overcomes
a key shortcoming of work on partisan learning by crafting a research design that has
the resolution to capture learning dynamics, on the one hand, and the temporal scope
to capture the campaign’s relevance over the long term, on the other.
1Gerber and Green (1999), push this evidence harder and argue that parallel patterns of opinion
change are synonymous with Bayesian updating. Bartels (2002) provides compelling evidence that
parallel updating does not adhere to Bayesian probability theory, but the point is irrelevant here. This
study asks what inferences voters draw from information exposure. Parallel opinion change would
occur when all voters reach the same conclusion post-exposure—for example, revising evaluations of
economic conditions downward after learning of a spike in unemployment.
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All told, this study contributes simultaneously to the partisan learning and cam-
paign effects literatures. In demonstrating that learning is governed by dynamic mech-
anisms, it clarifies the role of “actual-world” and “preferred-world” considerations
in shaping partisan inference across time. Equally important, the analysis produces
straightforward survey-based evidence that shows how campaigns affect voter under-
standing. What is the campaign’s role? As will be seen, the influence of actual- versus
preferred-world considerations is conditioned by whether there is an ongoing campaign
or not. In the broadest sense, this study bolsters empirically an idea that scholars
have often advocated but struggled to demonstrate: Campaigns play a crucial electoral
role not so much because they transmit information (or “enlighten”), but because they
organize and enhance political disagreement.2
3.1 Perspectives on Learning and Inference
National political campaigns have two essential features: they are high-information,
highly-partisan events. However, campaign scholars have tended to overlook the joint
influence of these two features. Outside of the campaign effects literature, one can
observe two perspectives on learning that help to clarify the unique role of information
or partisanship—information updating and motivated reasoning, respectively. However,
it will turn out that in isolation, neither theory sufficiently captures the parameters that
shape partisan inference.
2Indeed, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954, 183) characterize presidential campaigns as “a
system for organizing disagreements.”
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3.1.1 The Logic of Information Updating
Information updating requires that people regularly access meaningful information
about actual-world conditions. This information can come from a variety of sources,
including the media, social networks, and daily experiences, and the actual-world condi-
tions can be broad in scope, ranging from current economic trends like unemployment
and inflation to an officeholder’s issue stands or foreign policy success. The crucial
points are that the information is grounded by reality and that it has clear directional
implications. The latter point is especially important because it suggests that, when
viewed objectively, this information signifies the direction in which people should adjust
relevant perceptions and judgments.
The crux of information updating theory is that diverse groups with competing
interests draw the same inferences from information. It is worth emphasizing that
this view does not require that different groups hold identical perceptions on average,
but only that these groups respond to real-world information similarly. For example,
if Democrats and Republicans encounter news that the United States’ annual Gross
Domestic Product increased three-percent over the previous year’s reading, these groups
need not agree on a summary evaluation of the year’s economic improvement, but post-
exposure, both should revise their retrospective economic evaluations in the positive
direction.
If diverse partisan groups draw the same conclusions from information, then these
groups’ relevant political perceptions will display parallel temporal change. This expec-
tation is illustrated in Figure 3.1, which tracks updating on a hypothetical dimension
that ranges from “Worse” to “Better” (y-axis) over time (x-axis). For the sake of il-
lustration, assume that we are looking at partisan updating on perceptions of the U.S.
economy’s condition relative to one year ago. In absolute terms, each partisan group
disagrees about the level of economic performance: Republicans are consistently the
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Figure 3.1: (Hypothetical) Illustration of Parallel Belief Change Produced by Objective
Information Updating
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optimists, Democrats the pessimists, and Independents somewhere in between. Nev-
ertheless, as economic news gets disseminated over the 12-month period, Republicans,
Independents, and Democrats all interpret its meaning in the same way. A key feature
of parallel change is that it means the distance between group-level perceptions remains
constant across time.
3.1.2 Evidence for Information Updating
The evidence that partisans draw the same inferences from actual-world conditions
comes largely from a series of studies put forward by Donald Green and his colleagues.
In brief, these studies demonstrate that Democrats’, Republicans’, and Independents’
attitudes and beliefs change in parallel on a number of issues, including presidential
approval (Gerber and Green, 1999), retrospective evaluations of economic performance
(Gerber and Green, 1998), beliefs about political scandals (both Clinton’s guilt in the
Monica Lewinsky scandal and Nixon’s role in Watergate), and evaluations of candidate
performance in presidential debates (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). Further
evidence can be found in Page and Shapiro’s (1992) examination of Vietnam War
perceptions, which shows that even during an especially contentious period in American
politics, Democrats’ and Republicans’ evaluations of government success in Vietnam
moved in parallel.3 Thus, on several consequential issues spanning several critical eras
in American politics, scholars have consistently observed parallel changes in partisans’
group-level political perceptions.
3The evidence for parallelism also holds across levels of political sophistication. In a series of
studies, Enns (2007) has shown that members of various educational groupings display parallel changes
in preferences for government spending programs.
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3.1.3 The Logic of Motivated Reasoning
The evidence for information updating is compelling. But what about scholars’ claim
that partisans are “motivated reasoners”? Motivated reasoning theory eschews objec-
tive inference and says that, in fact, partisans do not accept the directional implications
of information uncritically. Because these committed citizens are motivated by a de-
sire to reach a conclusion about the world that benefits their party (i.e., to see their
preferred world), their interactions with information are subject to bias. Specifically,
these committed citizens tend to give excessive weight to belief-confirming evidence,
termed the “confirmation bias,” and to underweight or ignore that which runs contrary
to preferred-world beliefs, termed the “disconfirmation bias”(Taber and Lodge, 2006).4
Of course, in a two-party system, directional political information benefits one party
and hurts the other’s standing. As a result, one partisan group (say, Republicans)
will have an incentive to exaggerate the importance of this information while another
(here Democrats) will have strong incentive to resist it. In the language of motivated
reasoning, these Republicans will frequently succumb to the confirmation bias and
these Democrats to the disconfirmation bias. If so, then partisans will consistently
draw contradictory conclusions from the same information signals, in turn producing
group-level beliefs that diverge in opposite directions from reality. More simply, group-
level partisan perceptions will polarize.
A hypothetical account of such polarization is depicted in Figure 3.2. Continuing
with the economic retrospections example, Figure 3.2 indicates that Independents, who
have no reason to be biased, see that the economy improved slightly over the previous
year. Republicans, however, perceive an improving economy and Democrats one that is
4To illustrate this idea with a concrete example, consider perceptions about the U.S. military’s
success regarding the Iraq War. Supporters of the Iraq War would discount or ignore news about U.S.
troop casualties but accept Bush’s rhetorical claims for a “mission accomplished” without scrutiny,
perhaps even exaggerated their importance. Opponents of the War would do the opposite.
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worsening. Under the logic of motivated reasoning, such polarization would be expected
if the Republican Party benefits from an economic boom (which would be true under
a Republican president) and the Democratic Party benefits from an economic bust.
An important feature of such polarization is that it means the perceptual gap between
Republican and Democratic groups grows larger across time.
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Figure 3.2: (Hypothetical) Illustration of Perception Polarization Produced by Moti-
vated Reasoning
81
3.1.4 Evidence for Motivated Reasoning
What is the evidence for motivated reasoning? A long line of studies document that
partisan attachments color political perceptions—beginning with the work of Berel-
son, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) and Campbell et al. (1960) through Markus and
Converse (1979), Markus (1982), and Finkel (1993), and to recent work by Fischle
(2000) and Bartels (2002). Although most of these studies focus on party favoritism in
political perception, not belief polarization, several experimental studies in social and
political psychology demonstrate that exposure to belief-inconsistent information has
a polarizing effect, especially among the strongly committed (Pomerantz, Chaiken and
Tordesillas, 1995; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979; Taber and Lodge, 2006).
Is there reason to expect a similar pattern with regard to perceptions of political-
economic conditions? Hetherington (2001) has shown that polarization at the elite level
has increased the importance of parties for ordinary Americans, and Bartels (2000)
has also documented the increasing importance of partisanship since the early 1980s.
Crucially, where partisan attitudes are highly accessible and/or strong, learning and in-
ference should be affected by the confirmation and disconfirmation biases that together
predict belief polarization. Adding direct support to this expectation, Fischle (2000)
has shown that Republicans’ and Democrats’ perceptions about Clinton’s culpability
in the Lewinsky scandal did indeed polarize.
3.1.5 Toward a Reconciliation
The question is why both the parallelism of Figure 3.1 and the polarization of Figure
3.2 find empirical support. The answer is not immediately obvious, but because both
accounts find evidentiary support, the core component of each perspective likely plays
a role in partisan updating. To move forward, then, the next section introduces a
learning model that allows for the influence of both objective information updating
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and motivated reasoning.
3.2 An Integrated Model of Partisan Inference
At a basic level, integrating these two perspectives is straightforward. What is needed is
a model that simultaneously captures the influence of actual-world conditions, A, and
preferred-world states, P, on people’s political-economic perceptions. In slightly more
formal terms, political perceptions can be represented as follows: Perception = A+P.
This formulation should incorporate the temporal character of each component be-
cause each varies with time. The changes in A are a function of actual-world change.
P changes when a party suddenly benefits from an alternate world state. Perhaps the
most visible change on this front occurs when the presidency changes from Republican
to Democratic control (or vice versa). Because the Democratic and Republican Parties
benefit from different world states, each partisan group, g, has a particular P.
The model must also incorporate the parameters that govern the relative influence of
A and P. These parameters, ω(a) and ω(p), represent motivation toward accuracy- and
directionally-minded thinking, respectively. When ω(a) is large and ω(p) is small, one
seeks accurate understanding; when the reverse is true, one is more strongly motivated
to conclude that conditions are consistent with the preferred-world. Accounting for all
of these features using subscript notation produces Equation 3.1:
Perceptiont,g = ω
(a)At + ω
(p)Pt,g (3.1)
This basic model integrates information updating and motivated reasoning. It is
similar in spirit to John Zaller’s (1991; 1992) “RAS” model of attitude change in that
both Equation 3.1 and the RAS model rest on the joint influence of information- and
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partisan-based considerations.5 Nevertheless, three differences are worth noting. First,
Equation 3.1 draws on a single mental construct, psychological motivation, and its two
horns, accuracy and directional goals, not on the separate constructs that structure
the RAS model (i.e., political awareness and partisanship). Second, because the focus
of Equation 3.1 is on the mechanisms that undergird perceptions, not attitudes, the
model is better equipped to assess the quality of citizen updating. Perceptions involve
the characteristics and positions of political parties, elected officeholders, and political
conditions, all of which have real-world referents. Attitudes, on the other hand, are a
“marriage” of political information and normative beliefs about the world (Zaller, 1992,
6), which makes a discussion of temporal-response “accuracy” nonsensical. Finally, in
place of A, actual-world information, Zaller’s model hinges on elite rhetoric. But
allowing for actual-world information should provide a more realistic test of objective
learning. Information about actual conditions need not be disseminated from the “top-
down,” which means that it should be widely available. Moreover, it could resonate
relatively more forcefully because actual-world information often lacks the partisan cues
that accompany elite rhetoric.
3.2.1 Learning Dynamics
Equation 3.1 says that the goals that govern learning (i.e., the ω’s) are fixed.6 But
are people’s motives to be accurate and consistent in fact constant? Evidence from
social psychology gives reason to suspect that this static conception is problematic be-
cause different environmental contexts have been found to trigger the different horns
5The model also reflects ideas put forward by MacKuen (1984).
6Note that this static conception also characterizes the RAS model, in which political awareness, a
generally stable trait, works as the fundamental information assimilation mechanism.
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of motivation (Kruglanski, Webster and Klem, 1996). That is to say, different polit-
ical contexts should shift the balance of accuracy-minded versus directionally-minded
thinking. What might engage such psychological dynamism and alter the influence of
actual- and preferred-worlds on perceptions?
National Campaigns
The most important potential source of dynamics is the national political campaign.
Because the campaign, or more accurately campaign intensity,7 activates and strength-
ens partisanship, partisans should be increasingly motivated by partisan concerns later
in the election cycle. And, due to the upturn in media coverage, the politicians and
pundits who emphasize the preferred world should be more visible in the campaign’s
later stages. For these reasons, partisans should place increasing emphasis on their pre-
ferred world as the campaign evolves, which, in terms of the dynamic-motives model,
says that ω(p) will increase over the election cycle.
Importantly, this argument about campaigns has a complementary prediction that
involves the post-campaign “decompression.” As the intensity that surged during the
run-up to the general election dissipates, the accessibility and strength of partisan
attitudes should decline in turn. The weight that partisans place on P should decline as
well, and if so, then partisans will give greater weight to information about actual-world
conditions. The possibility of an increase in the value of ω(a) post-campaign intimates
a third pattern of partisan updating—belief convergence—that political scientists have
left largely unexplored.8
7Work by George Rabinowitz and Stuart MacDonald (e.g., Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989) points
to the importance of intensity for shaping voter decision-making.
8The important exception is a study by Larry Bartels (2002), in which he argues that convergence
across partisan groups is expected when partisan learning and inference obeys Bayesian probability
theory.
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Group Membership
A second source of dynamics involves partisan group-membership, specifically, whether
partisans belong to the relevant “in-group” or the “out-group.” In-out group standing is
important because, relative to out-groups, equally committed in-group partisans should
be more strongly influenced by their preferred world (see Granberg, 1993). Because the
present study defines the preferred world as the world state that benefits one’s party,
and the party reference point is the party of the sitting president, partisans who belong
to the president’s party are classified as the in-group (“in-partisans”) and partisans
who do not as the out-group (“out-partisans”). Importantly, when in- and out-groups
are defined as such, in-partisans’ perceptions do turn out to be influenced by their
preferred-world state to a relatively greater extent (Parker-Stephen, 2006).
3.2.2 Dynamic Motives
To account for these sources of dynamics, time and group subscripts are added to the
ω’s. The integrated learning model is thus Equation 3.2. In words, the model says that
temporal group-level perceptions are a weighted function of actual-world information
and preferred-world beliefs. The influence of these two components changes as a func-
tion of time (whether there is an ongoing campaign or not is especially important) and
in-out partisan group status. With the theoretical argument now captured by Equation
3.2, I turn first to a discussion of research design and data, and then to analyses of
model implications.
Perceptiont,g = ω
(a)
t,gAt + ω
(p)
t,gPt,g (3.2)
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3.3 Design
To a great extent, studies of partisan learning are broad in temporal scope. At a
minimum, these studies consider changes over intervals that are several months apart
(e.g., Bartels, 2002; Fischle, 2000). More frequently, year-to-year changes are examined
(e.g., Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). Although this perspective is useful for
evaluating learning over the long term, these studies lack the resolution to pick up on
patterns that occur over relatively shorter time periods.
On the flip side, studies of campaign effects adopt a narrow temporal frame. Schol-
ars’ focus on the short-term influence of exposure to particular events and messages
has shown, for example, that events like presidential debates alter voter preference
(Hillygus and Jackman, 2003) and knowledge (Holbrook, 1999), and that (simulated)
exposure to candidate rhetoric alters judgment (Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau, 1995)
and decision making (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). The problem, however, is that this
short-term focus does not allow for changes that could occur over several months, not
several days. In addition, short-term campaign exposures have been found to have
transitory effects (Kuklinski et al., 2000; Druckman and Nelson, 2003).
To examine learning while allowing for campaign influence thus requires both long-
and short-term temporal windows. Toward this end, this study employs an incremental
analysis that considers group-level perception trends over a twenty-four year (1980–
2004), five-year (2002–2006), three-year (2003–2005), and seven-month (2000) period.
To preserve consistency, each analysis focuses on the central components of Equation
3.2 by examining the role that (1) actual-world information and (2) preferred-world
beliefs have on (3) political-economic perceptions. This straightforward approach is in
the spirit of Chris Achen’s (2002) call for analytic simplicity (i.e., “A Rule of Three”).
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3.4 Data
3.4.1 Economic Perceptions
A major focus of this study is people’s perceptions of national economic performance,
which is advantageous for several reasons. Most important, questions about economic
policy are an enduring part of the American political debate. Equally important, the
economy’s standing is often a prominent topic of discussion in national election cam-
paigns. Its standing matters for individual citizens, too, which suggests that people
have incentives to develop grounded perceptions. Finally, economic conditions them-
selves have objectively measured real-world referents, found in indicators like the the
unemployment and inflation rates, that are a regular emphasis of economic report-
ing. This makes it possible to identify the actual-world conditions that should inform
perceptions.
Because this study examines economic perceptions over several different time inter-
vals, the data must be drawn from several sources. In each case the perceptions variable
taps evaluations of national economic conditions. In the analysis that spans 1980–2004,
the perceptions data are drawn from the American National Election Studies (ANES)
Cumulative Series, which has asked for respondents’ economic retrospections in every
two-year survey since 1980.9 In the analysis that spans the 2003–2005 period, I use data
from the CBS News/New York Times opinion polls. In months where the CBS data are
not available I draw on the ABC News/Washington Post organizations’ monthly polling
9The two–part question reads as follows: “Would you say that over the past year the nation’s
economy has gotten better, stayed (all years except 1984: about) the same or gotten worse? (If
better:) Would you say much better or somewhat better? (If worse:) Would you say much worse
or somewhat worse?” The response categories have been recoded (“Much worse” = −2; “Somewhat
worse” = −1; “Stayed the same” = 0; “Somewhat better” = 1; “Much Better” = 2)
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data.10 The media polls’ data are obtained from the Roper Center’s iPoll archive. Fi-
nally, in the analysis of economic perceptions during the 2000 election, I use data from
the 2000 National Annenberg Election Study (NAES).11
3.4.2 The Iraq War: Saddam Hussein and 9/11
The second perceptual domain examined in this study involves perceptions related to
the Iraq War, specifically, group-level beliefs about Saddam’s role in the September 11th
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Claims regarding this connection
provided a crucial justification for the Iraq War, and people’s perceptions about it have
proven to be persistent and central determinants of support/opposition for the broader
Iraq endeavor (Jacobson, 2007). Here I examine perceptions from 2002–2006. During
this time, actual-world evidence increasingly indicated that Saddam was not involved in
9/11, but wishful thinking and the influence of preferred worlds could shape perceptions
nonetheless. The reason is straightforward: the Republican Party benefits if Saddam
was involved (by lending justification to the 2003 invasion), and the Democratic Party
benefits if he was not (by challenging a central rationale for the invasion). The opinion
data are drawn from Gallup and CBS News/New York Times opinion polls accessed via
the Roper Center archive to produce an irregular time series that spans 2002–2006.12
10The CBS News/New York Times perceptions item reads: “How would you rate the condition of
the national economy these days? Is it very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?” The ABC
News/Washington Post question reads: “Would you describe the state of the nation’s economy these
days as excellent, good, not so good or poor?” Because these categorical responses differ slightly,
I reduce both response items to a dichotomous scale, which equals a 0 if economic conditions are
perceived as being unfavorable and a 1 if conditions are perceived as favorable.
11The Annenberg economic perceptions item reads: “Over the past year, would you say that the
economic policies of the federal government have made the nation’s economy better, worse, or haven’t
they made much difference either way?” The response categories have been recoded (“Worse” = −1;
“No Difference” = 0; “Better” = 1)
12The question reads: “Do you think Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the September
11th terrorist attacks (against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon), or not?” Exact question
wording changed slightly across the two surveys, which is reflected by what appears in parentheses.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Economic Perceptions, 1980–2004
Let us begin with partisans’ retrospective economic perceptions over the long term
(1980–2004). This scope is similar to Alan Gerber and Donald Green’s (1999) study
of presidential approval from 1953–1988, which examines annual readings of presiden-
tial approval for Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. Here the focus is on
biennial readings of economic perceptions, specifically the average economic percep-
tions for presidential in- and out-partisans. (Partisans are defined as either “Strong”
or “Weak” Republicans and Democrats, but not leaners, because subsequent analyses
require combining pure Independents and leaners into a single baseline category.) The
guiding question is whether economic-perception patterns reveal information updating
(Gerber and Green demonstrate parallelism using the approval ratings) or motivated
reasoning.
Figure 3.3 presents in- and out-partisans’ average perceptions from 1980–2004, and
the pattern is stark—the two economic perceptions series immediately recall the par-
allel updating illustrated in Figure 3.1. The two series are correlated at .87, which
further suggests that in- and out-partisan groups consistently attend to economic news
and draw the same inferences from it. To test for this connection to reality, Table 3.1
presents the results of a regression model in which the in- and out-partisan average
perceptions series are regressed on the annual percent change in unemployment and
inflation.13 For both series, the annual change in unemployment significantly influ-
ences group-level perceptions. For a one-percent upturn in the unemployment rate,
in-partisans’ economic perceptions fall 8.4-percent on the retrospections scale—clearly
13Here the change is calculated as the average monthly percentage change from November 1st of the
non-election year to the end of October 31st of the election year.
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Figure 3.3: Average Economic Perceptions for Presidential In- and Out-partisans, 1980–
2004
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Table 3.1: Regression of In- and Out-Partisan Average Economic Perceptions on Annual
∆ Unemployment and Annual ∆ Inflation
Economic Perceptions Series
Indicators In-Partisan Out-Partisan
∆ Unemployment −0.42** −0.35*
(0.10) (0.12)
∆ Inflation −0.29 −0.30
(0.31) (0.38)
Constant −0.04 −0.33
(0.16) (0.20)
Adjusted-R2 .63 .43
OLS Regression, Standard Errors in Parentheses
*p < .05, **p < .01; Two-tailed tests
In each model, N = 13
the correct directional response. Out-partisans’ perceptions significantly decline by a
nearly equivalent 7-percent. And thus, economic information resonates similarly across
the two partisan camps.
Accounting for Strength of Partisanship
This first-cut examination suggests that changes in unemployment are understood and
appreciated by in- and out-partisans to a near equal degree. But of course, partisans’
preferred-world beliefs are most likely to be influential among the strongly committed.
Scholars who advocate the information updating perspective have not accounted for
partisan strength, but this is accomplished easily enough using the National Election
Studies’ 7-point party identification item, in which “Strong” Democrats and Republi-
cans comprise the scale endpoints.
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Do strong partisans’ perceptions polarize? Figure 3.4 charts the 1980–2004 economic
retrospections for these in- and out-partisans and, contrasted against Figure 3.3, two
differences are noteworthy. First, the distance between the two perceptions series,
which indicates the magnitude of strong-partisan disagreement, is greater for strong
partisans. Secondly, the correlation between the two series drops to a more modest
.80, suggesting less similarity in the temporal trend. And so, considered in isolation,
strong partisans’ perceptions could be less connected to reality. However, when these
perceptions are regressed on changes in unemployment and inflation as in Table 3.1, the
significant effect of unemployment change is nearly identical, although the explanatory
power as seen in the Adjusted-R2’s decreases in both regressions (results not reported).
The evidence is once again consistent with the objective information updating, which
leads one to wonder: Where is the motivated reasoning?
The Campaign Constant
By now the reader has perhaps recognized the difficulty in studying learning patterns
from election to election: the campaign becomes a constant. That is, because the data
offer a portrait of economic perceptions during election years only, and from only late
August through the November general election campaign at that, the above analysis
could be construed as one that holds the campaign environment constant. That this
approach controls for campaign intensity indicates the central problem with studies
that consider partisan learning patterns over long time intervals.
However, there is one important source of campaign variation in these NES readings:
Seven capture partisans’ perceptions in a year in which there was a presidential election
campaign, while in the other six, only candidates running for Congress were on the
campaign trail. Because the expectations for the campaign’s influence on A and P are
a function of intensity, this presidential-congressional election distinction is potentially
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important. Without question, presidential campaigns are relatively more intense. If the
weight partisans place on their preferred world is a function of campaign intensity, then
there should be differences between in- and out-partisans’ perceptions in presidential
versus congressional election years.
A test for differential effects examines the distance between in- and out-partisans’
average perceptions in presidential versus congressional election years. Figure 3.5 and
Figure 3.6 plot the distance between in- and out-partisans economic perceptions at
every two-year interval. Figure 3.5 illustrates the difference for in- and out-partisans
generally, and Figure 3.6 for strong partisans. In the former there is a visible difference
between presidential and congressional election-year disagreement. The mean distance
for congressional election-years is 0.18. In presidential election-years, the mean rises to
0.37. This larger disagreement in presidential election-years is what one would expect
if campaign intensity increases the importance of partisans’ preferred worlds, but the
effect is not overpowering. In fact, a difference in means test between the two election-
type years is not statistically significant (t = −1.12, p = .14).
Figure 3.6 presents these perception distance measures for strong partisans only.
Here the effect of campaign type is significant and strong. In congressional election-
years, in-out disagreement is 0.54 units on average, or approximately 10-percent on
the 5-point retrospections scale. However, in presidential election-years, this difference
grows to 0.94 units (19-percent), a near doubling of the size of strong partisan disagree-
ment. The difference in means is also statistically significant (t = −2.06, p < .05). And
so, for the partisans who are most likely to be motivated reasoners, campaign inten-
sity matters. Presidential election campaigns activate and reinforce the importance of
partisans’ preferred worlds to a greater degree than congressional campaigns, thereby
increasing ω(p) and enhancing partisan disagreement about the economy’s standing.
This evidence certainly suggests that campaigns can generate polarized partisan
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perceptions. The presidential- versus congressional-year differences lend support to the
notion that the influence of preferred-worlds is triggered by campaign intensity, but
solidifying the point requires data that have finer temporal resolution. Let us turn to
examine what happens to perceptions over the course of a single election cycle (and
then beyond).
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3.5.2 Economic Perceptions: 2003–2005
The second analysis considers economic perceptions from January 2003 through Decem-
ber 2005—that is, a full election cycle plus an additional year. If party identification
takes on increasing importance during the 2003–2004 election cycle, then the campaign
should produce an increase in the value of ω(p), and this increase should be observable
via increasing separation between Republicans’ and Democrats’ group-level economic
perceptions. Of course, in the 2003–2004 election cycle, Republicans are the in-partisans
and Democrats the out-partisans.
Figure 3.7 charts the proportion of Republicans and Democrats who perceive that
economic conditions are favorable over not favorable.14 To begin, let us separate the
election cycle into two halves—2003 versus 2004, where the gray line denotes the 2003–
2004 split. Looking at these series for 2003 only, the pattern is moderately consistent
with information updating. The correlation between the two series (in their raw form)
is .72 over the 2003 period. In terms of their connection to the actual world economy,
the Republican series is correlated with month-to-month change in the unemployment
rate at −.52 in 2003 (p < .10, one-tailed), and the correlation for the Democrats’ series
equals −.26 (but although it is signed correctly, it is not statistically significant).
With regard to 2004, however, the series slip apart. The series’ correlation between
January and October (r = .52) indicates that less than 30-percent of the variance is
shared. But it is not just that the series grow apart from one another: In 2004, neither
Republicans’ nor Democrats’ perceptions are significantly related to real changes in
unemployment (the same holds for changes in inflation).
Has the 2004 presidential election campaign enhanced the influence of P? Figure
3.8 plots the distance between Republican and Democrat economic perceptions for each
14Note that in this figure and the following illustrations, all economic perceptions series have been
smoothed using a two-month moving average.
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monthly reading, and the figure reveals that the magnitude of Republican-Democrat
disagreement increases as the election cycle evolves. Of course, this increase is consistent
with the idea that the preferred world’s increasing importance generates perception
polarization.
The Weight of the Preferred World
The focus on group-level mean perceptions in the 2003–2004 election cycle provides
cogent evidence of the campaign’s effect on voter information. To examine systemat-
ically how partisan activation increases the importance of partisans’ preferred worlds,
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I estimate a series of binary probit models using the individual-level media polls’ data
(from which the averages for the 2003–2004 period were created). In each monthly
model people’s economic perceptions (the dependent variable) are scored a one if they
perceived that the economy’s current standing was “very good” or “fairly good,” and
a 0 if they saw it as “fairly bad” or “very bad.” The independent variables are two
dichotomous party identification indicators, one that signifies Republican Party be-
longing and a second that signifies that the respondent is a Democrat. The baseline
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category is Pure Independents plus leaners.15
The intent is to generate a statistical reflection of the changing value that Repub-
licans and Democrats place on their respective preferred worlds and shed light on the
across-time magnitude of ω(p). In every estimation the relevant coefficients for the Re-
publican and Democratic identifiers are statistically significant.16 The results of these
monthly probit regressions are summarized in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10. In each
figure, the plotted values represent the discrete change in the probability of seeing a
favorable economy for that month—first for Republicans (R), and then for Democrats
(D). In both figures a lowess curve is added to capture the trend.
Looking first at the discrete change in the probability of a favorable economic per-
ception for a Republican in relation to an Independent/leaner, illustrated in Figure 3.9,
one can see that Republican identification has an increasingly strong effect on economic
perceptions as the election cycle evolves. Being a Republican identifier in January 2003
makes one about 15-percent more likely to see an economy that matches with the pre-
ferred world. By October of 2004, however, this probability nearly triples to 40-percent.
And so, for in-partisan Republicans, P increases by approximately 25-percent over the
2003–2004 election cycle.
We see a similar pattern, albeit weaker, for the Democrats. Here the change in
the probability of seeing a favorable economy diminishes as the campaign evolves. In
January of 2003 Democrats are 12-percent less likely to view economic conditions in a
favorable light, but by late 2004 their reliance on the preferred world more than doubles
15There is evidence that leaners behave more like weak partisans than pure Independents (Keith
et al., 1992). Although this is a valid observation, its relevance here matters little. The concern is
with the activation of partisanship, and so if these leaners are similar to partisans, it will only make
statistical demonstrations of displacement from the baseline category more difficult.
16Models that control for additional individual attributes, including income, race, age, and educa-
tion, have no effect on the significance of the party coefficients. Therefore, these additional variables
are not included in the estimations presented below. This is important because these factors are not
a part of the theory captured by Equation 3.2.
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the probability of an unfavorable economic perception to approximately 27-percent.
For out-partisans, then, the campaign ups the importance of P by approximately 15-
percent. Note the expected asymmetry: for in-partisans the increase in ω(p) (25-percent)
is substantially larger than for out-partisans (15-percent).
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Campaign Decompression
Clearly campaigns matter for economic perceptions. Their intensity alters the relative
weight partisans give to A and P, in turn producing perception polarization. But
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if this is truly a function of dynamic motives, then the absence of the campaign en-
vironment should also have discernable effect. Figure 3.11 illustrates the magnitude
of disagreement on the same economic perceptions scale for the post-election period.
The first observation is taken from a CBS News Poll conducted between 18-21 Novem-
ber 2004, and the subsequent readings follow from media polls conducted throughout
2005 (due to data limitations a monthly series is not available for 2005). Figure 3.11
shows that post-election decompression is indeed a real phenomenon—here, beliefs con-
verge. Because the importance of the preferred world declines, Republican-Democrat
disagreement decreases significantly following the November election.
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3.5.3 Economic Perceptions: 2000 Campaign
A final look at economic perceptions considers change during the 2000 campaign. This
third analysis is useful not only because the in-out partisan designation is reversed,
with Democrats now in-partisans and Republicans out-partisans, but also because the
2000 NAES data allow the comparison of updating across strong- and weak-partisan
groups.
To begin, consider the familiar group-level perceptions trends, plotted in Figure
3.12(a). These series are the average group-level perceptions of the federal govern-
ment’s policy impact on economic conditions compared to one year ago. The average is
calculated from a three-point retrospection scale (“Worse” = −1; “No Difference” = 0;
“Better” = 1). Figure 3.12(b) plots the magnitude of Democrat-Republican disagree-
ment, and once again, both patterns exemplify the influence of dynamic motives and
campaign effects. As the campaign becomes increasingly prominent, so too does the
preferred world in partisans’ thinking. The effect is pronounced among the in-partisan
Democrats, and the increase is especially strong following the 2000 Democratic Con-
vention (note the change from August to September). The convention shock boosts
ω(p) and, in turn, Democrats’ belief that federal economic policies produced a favorable
upturn in economic conditions.
In the Republican case, the perceptions series resembles a flat line. It is possible that
Republicans’ perceptions were not affected by the 2000 campaign, but before drawing
this conclusion, it is important to remember something shown previously: the influence
of the campaign is most likely to influence strong partisans. Because the 2000 NAES
asked identifiers to say whether they are strongly or weakly committed, the data allow
a test of this possibility.
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Strong versus Weak Partisans: Who Polarizes?
Figure 3.13 presents separate perceptions series for strong and weak Republicans and
makes clear the difference between strong and weak partisans. Weak partisans are
relatively more optimistic (recall that the scale is centered on “0”, so both series reflect
a summary positive perception), and in terms of change, the series is flat. Strong
Republicans’ perceptions, however, do trend downward, conforming to expectations
where dynamic motives are in play.
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The fact that strong, but not weak, Republicans display the requisite perception
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change for producing polarization raises an issue that has thus far been ignored: Perhaps
the changes in perceptions among the strong partisans are a reflection of partisan
“conversion”—that is, a shift from weak to strong identification—that in turn produces
polarization as an artifact of the changing composition, not shifting learning motives.
Rejecting this explanation for polarization requires observing patterns that indicate
ω(p) increases for both strong and weak partisans. This is not the case in terms of the
Republican partisans, at least over the 7-month interval available in the Annenberg
data, but of course, these Republicans are the out-partisans, and we have seen that the
preferred-world has a consistently weaker influence on out-partisan perceptions. Is the
case different for in-party Democrats?
Figure 3.14 answers in the affirmative. Here both strong and weak Democrats’ per-
ceptions grow more optimistic over the 2000 election campaign. The effect for strong
Democrats is especially pronounced—their perceptions jump 13-percent on average
over a few short months. Weak Democrats’ perceptions increase by just over 5-percent.
Given the actual economy’s health during the 2000 campaign (recall the well-publicized
dot-com bust that occurred midway through 2000), this increasing optimism is almost
certainly not a function of the actual-world. Instead, the campaign activates and re-
inforces the importance of P for both strong and weak Democrats. This is important
because it shows that, although they hold tight to their “weakly-committed” status,
campaigns make weak partisans think more like their strongly-committed counterparts.
That campaigns make weaker partisans “more partisan” is the very model of a cam-
paign organizing disagreement.
3.5.4 Saddam Hussein and September 11th
The examination of economic perceptions has produced results consistent with the
motivation-based learning model. I now turn quickly to a second perceptual domain to
108
Survey Month (Year = 2000)
M
ov
in
g 
Av
er
ag
e 
Ec
on
om
ic 
Po
lic
y 
Re
tro
sp
ec
tio
n
0.
35
0.
40
0.
45
0.
50
0.
55
0.
60
0.
65
0.
70
April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Figure 3.14: Average Monthly Perception of Economic Policy’s Effect: Strong and
Weak Democratic Party Identifiers, April–November 2000.
109
assess the model’s broader applicability. Here expectations and methods mirror those
shown previously, and so attention turns directly to group-level perceptions of Saddam
Hussein’s role in 9/11.
Figure 3.15 illustrates the proportion of Republicans and Democrats agreeing that
Saddam was involved in planning the September 11th terrorist attacks. For the as-
sessment of dynamic learning, three temporal periods are important: the lead up to
the 2004 campaign, the campaign itself, and the post-election period. The first pe-
riod, which spans August 2002 through April 2004, finds Republicans and Democrats
displaying similar responsiveness to events. Following Colin Powell’s United Nations
speech, for example, both Republicans and Democrats became more likely to connect
Saddam to 9/11. Moreover, after Saddam’s capture in December of 2003, which was
accompanied by the discovery of personal documents that revealed Saddam viewed
Al Qaeda more as an antagonist than an ally, both groups grew skeptical about Sad-
dam’s role in the attacks. Crucially, these and other pre-campaign trends reflect the
directional implications of the available actual-world information.
In early April of 2004, however, the two series begin to slip apart. Although by
this point there was a general consensus among experts like David Kay that Saddam
played no role in planning 9/11, Republicans nevertheless became more likely to see this
connection. Indeed, these partisans continued to resist the evidence through October
of 2004. Democrats, on the other hand, became consistently more likely to perceive no
connection between Iraq’s dictator and the 9/11 hijackers. As with economic percep-
tions, then, such perception divergence is observed because people’s preferred worlds
crystallize and in turn generate relatively stronger effects on perceptions.
Finally, in the two readings taken after the 2004 campaign, one can observe the third
expected pattern—belief convergence. By this time the elite-level consensus outside of
the adminstration, including the findings released by the 9/11 commission, fell firmly
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on the notion that Saddam had no party in planning the attacks of September 11th.
This being the case, why would Democrats grow more likely to see a connection between
Saddam and 9/11 in 2005 and 2006? The answer, it would seem, is that this shift was
a consequence of Democrats’ placing less importance on P following the 2004 election.
3.6 Conclusion
This study has now come full circle. What began as a question about the campaign’s
role in shaping voter information quickly turned to the importance of partisan learning
and inference more generally. But to make sense of the contradictory conclusions from
the literature on partisan learning, it was necessary to clarify the role of political cam-
paigns in shaping partisan inference. The fusion of these two disparate literatures has
resulted in a unified perspective on campaigns and learning, which shows convincingly
the importance of the campaign context for understanding updating, and of studying
campaign effects through the lens of partisan learning and inference.
The demonstration of learning dynamics reveals the utility of integrating the role
of actual-world conditions for information updating with the role of preferred-world
states for motivated reasoning. The integrated model presented in Equation 3.2 does
this, and the incremental analyses presented throughout give this model strong and
consistent support. In the economic realm, which is both objectively-oriented and an
enduring feature of American politics, partisans’ perceptions are influenced by actual-
world conditions and preferred-world beliefs. And in terms of the Iraq War, the effect
of dynamic motives are visible yet again. There is every reason to believe that these
patterns would arise across perceptual domains.
The crucial points about partisan learning are thus twofold. First, the relative
influence of reality and preferred beliefs on learning and inference is not fixed. Second,
because scholars have not appreciated these dynamics, studies of learning and inference
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have heretofore arrived at contradictory conclusions. If one examines learning patterns
over long-term periods, say, from election-to-election or even year-to-year, the effect of
actual-world conditions is magnified because the preferred-world’s impact is minimized.
In looking over the short-term, on the other hand, an unchanging reality masks its
importance and gives the appearance of bias and even polarization.
In finding clear and consistent evidence of the campaign’s role in affecting learning
dynamics, this study presents cogent evidence that campaigns matter. For too long, the
literature on campaign relevance has been focused on the ability of campaign events and
messages to persuade. But given the evidence presented in this study, as well findings
presented as ongoing work (see Brady and Johnston 2006), it is now clear this focus
is unlikely to bear fruit. The campaign activates preexisting loyalties and accentuates
their role in shaping voter thinking, and in so doing, plays an organizing role, not an
enlightening or a persuasive one. Few studies have presented clear-cut evidence of the
campaign’s organizing influence; this study does exactly that.
Campaigns, especially presidential campaigns, have substantial effects on how par-
tisans see the world. By looking at perceptions, not attitudes or vote intentions, we see
how and why campaigns matter. Of course, their influence is paradoxical: At a time
when political information is most readily available, when the media are engrossed in
political discussion, and when politicians make their strongest case to voters, many
citizens are least likely to consider information in an even-handed way. As a result,
partisan disagreement about actual-world conditions grows until polarization reaches
its height as voters head to the polls on election day. This could be reason for concern,
but one must also remember the evidence in broader perspective, in terms of what hap-
pens after the intensity subsides: Elections are decided, preferred worlds recede from
public consciousness, and voters and their perceptions are shaped once more by the
real-world changes that guide collective desires.
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